Professor Alex Gershkov
Professor of Economics
Qualifications: BA, MA, PhD
Email: a.gershkov@surrey.ac.uk
Further information
Biography
Alex received his BA in Economics and Accounting, MA in Economics and PhD in Economics from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel), completing his doctoral studies in 2005. Since that time, he has worked as a Research Fellow and Junior Professor at the University of Bonn, before returning to The Hebrew University of Jerusalem to become a Senior Lecturer (2009-2012).
Alex divides his time between Surrey University and his role as Associate Professor at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
His professional activities include Associate Editor of the International Journal of Game Theory, Editorial Board Member of the Review of Economic Studies, Program committee member of ESEM 2012, and Program committee member of EC 2010.
Research Interests
Alex’s main research interests are in Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Mechanism Design and Contract Theory. His recent work focuses on dynamic mechanism design and dynamic contracts and explores different aspects of sustaining incentives in dynamic mechanisms and environments.
Publications
Journal articles
- . (2013) 'Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation'. Economics Letters, 118 (1), pp. 121-125.
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(2012) 'On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation'. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society,
[ Status: Accepted ] - . (2012) 'Optimal search, learning and implementation'. Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (3), pp. 881-909.
- . (2012) 'Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach'. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30 (3), pp. 283-286.
- . (2012) 'Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection'. Review of Economic Studies, 79 (1), pp. 268-306.
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(2011) 'Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem'. Theoretical Economics, 6 (2), pp. 157-184.doi: 10.3982/TE700
- . (2010) 'When queueing is better than push and shove'. International Journal of Game Theory, 39 (3), pp. 409-430.
- . (2010) 'Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information'. Games and Economic Behavior, 68 (1), pp. 144-154.
- . (2009) 'Optimal auctions and information disclosure'. Review of Economic Design, 13 (4), pp. 335-344.
- . (2009) 'Learning about the future and dynamic efficiency'. American Economic Review, 99 (4), pp. 1576-1587.
- . (2009) 'Tournaments with midterm reviews'. Games and Economic Behavior, 66 (1), pp. 162-190.
- . (2009) 'Efficient tournaments within teams'. RAND Journal of Economics, 40 (1), pp. 103-119.
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(2009) 'Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach'. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1 (2), pp. 168-198.doi: 10.1257/mic.1.2.168
- . (2009) 'Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition'. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (1), pp. 36-68.
Scholarly editions
- . (2010) When Queuening is Better than Push and Shove.
