cii Seminar 2 May

Cancelled- How Political Correctness Hobbled U.S. Foreign Policy in Iraq

When?

Wednesday 2 May 2012, 15.30 to 17.00

Where?

21 AC 03

Open to:

Staff, Public, Students

Speaker:

Ginger Cruz, former U.S. Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and current President of Mantid International

Ginger Cruz, former U.S. Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and current President of Mantid International ((www.mantidinternational.com)

Ms Ginger Cruz discusses the impact of "political correctness” on U.S. foreign policy in Iraq.  During her eight years conducting oversight of the $60 billion U.S. reconstruction effort,  Ms. Cruz spent more than two years on the ground in Iraq.  There, she assessed the value of a wide variety of programs, from multibillion security-assistance initiatives to well-intentioned, albeit often-ineffectual,  efforts to help displaced persons and religious minorities.  Her experiences afforded her a unique vantage point from which to view the pernicious effects of overlaying Western expectations and assumptions onto the chaotic realities of a war-ravaged land.  

Hamstrung from the start by a government-wide inability to define the scope and duration of the mission, Washington wasted years trying to prioritize among an often-contradictory set of goals.  Was it better to build ultramodern medical facilities and water plants in a country that lacked the electrical and human infrastructure to sustain them?  Would the Iraqis regard the construction of anything less as an insult?  Conversely, were large-scale infrastructure projects a blind alley, and training Iraqi civil servants and law-enforcement personnel the better way to proceed?  Or should such capacity-development endeavors take a back seat to a society-wide, root-and-branch effort to eliminate all forms of what most Westerners  would consider “corruption”?

While senior U.S. officials struggled with crafting high-level strategy, more junior personnel often found themselves adrift in an environment for which they were ill-prepared.  Idealistic rhetoric about the “U.S.-Iraqi partnership” quickly wore thin when undertrained U.S. advisors on their first overseas mission attempted to educate experienced Iraqi security officials about gender equity in the workplace, while terrorists killed and maimed dozens of police officers and soldiers every month.  Too often, lesson plans drafted in the United States were found wanting in Iraq.  

Communicating U.S. objectives and accomplishments to the Iraqi people was also fraught with perils and complexities too often ignored by reconstruction managers.  While labeling a project as “Made in the U.S.A.” certainly displayed the fruits of America’s labors for all to see, it made the project a target for insurgents and could lead some Iraqis to perceive their local leadership as ineffectual.  On the other hand, building a bridge or a school and allowing a local chieftain to take credit for it could inadvertently engender resentment among his rivals who received no such largesse from the United States.  In Iraq, how to decide—and whom should decide—was rarely an easy question to answer.

“Nation building” is difficult enough when the objectives are clear, the leadership unified, and the security environment permissive.  But attempting to rebuild Iraq and its institutions in the absence of all three led to avoidable deaths, wasted dollars, and unmet strategic goals.