CEO Compensation, Family Control, and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe
- When?
- Wednesday 7 November 2012, 13.00
- Where?
- Teaching Block 1
- Open to:
- Alumni, Public, Staff, Students
- Speaker:
- Dr Neslihan Ozkan
The Finance and Accounting Group would like to welcome Dr Neslihan Ozkan to speak
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of family control and institutional investors on CEO pay packages in Continental Europe, using a dataset of 754 listed firms with 3,731 firm-year observations from 14 countries during 2001-2008. We find that family control curbs the level of CEO total and cash compensation, and the fraction of equity-based compensation. Moreover, we do not observe a significant effect of family control on the excess level of total and cash compensation. This evidence indicates that controlling families do not use CEO compensation to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. We show that institutional ownership is associated with higher levels of CEO cash and total compensation in Continental Europe, especially in family firms. Also, foreign institutional investors have a positive, significant impact on CEO compensation level. Finally, results indicate that institutional investors affect CEO pay structure: they increase the use of equity-based compensation in both family and non-family firms.
Dr Neslihan Ozkan is interested in Financial Economics, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. I teach Financial Markets and Corporate Finance at undergraduate and postgraduate level.
