Ms Ya Gao
Postgraduate Research (PhD) Full Time Student, SII Coordinator
Qualifications: BA Business English (University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China), MSc Investment Management (ICMA, University of Reading, UK)
Email: ya.gao@surrey.ac.uk
Further information
Biography
Ms Ya Gao joined the University of Surrey as a PhD Researcher in October 2010. Her experience in financial industry includes working as a key team-player in the asset management team of a £210 million equivalent Grade A office building in CBD area, Beijing; and in the Government Affair Department of Veolia (Beijing), which is a the largest investment company globally specialized in environmental projects investment.
In addition, she was a part-time lecturer in University of International Business and Economics, Capital University of Economics and Business, and University of Science and Technology in Beijing. These three respectable universities, cooperating with Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA), offer the first 2-3 years courses for Higher National Diploma (HND) programme. She led modules of Introduction to Economics, Business Finance and Financial Management, which were taught bilingually in both Chinese and English. The lecturing experience cultivates her ambition to become an academic.
Research Interests
Research Statement
The examination and re-examination of the chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration has been a non-stop process. The perks and bonuses of top executives are still escalating despite of the depressed economic climate. Although China is an emerging market, the CEOs of Chinese listed firms, are not exceptions to this trend. Originating from an equalitarianism wage system in former planning economy, Chinese listed firms are on the way of transforming the compensation contract design of their top executives referring to the models in the mature market. It is crucial to track reform results, among which, this study tries to answer: (1) What reference points are being used intentionally or unintentionally in Chinese top executive contract design and can we analyse them systematically? (2) How does the deviation of CEOs’ actual compensation from their reference points affect their compensation changes? By knowing the answers to these two questions, we can take a more completed and systematic point of view to examine the dimensional reference-point dependent nature of top executive contract design.
Supervisors
Professor Jean Chen, Dr Gang Li
Research Interests
Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation
Teaching
BSc Level 2 Business Finance Tutorials