European Identity and Islamic Otherness in British, French and Russian TV News Broadcasts

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Professor Chris Flood
Department of Political, International and Policy Studies
University of Surrey
 Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
+44 (0)1483 682 850
c.flood@surrey.ac.uk

Dr. Henri Nickels
Department of Political, International and Policy Studies
University of Surrey
 Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
+44 (0)1483 686 196
h.nickels@surrey.ac.uk

Professor Stephen Hutchings
School of Languages, Linguistics and Cultures
Department of Russian Studies
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
+44 (0)161 275 8307
Stephen.Hutchings@manchester.ac.uk

Dr. Galina Miazhevich
School of Languages, Linguistics and Cultures
Department of Russian Studies
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
+44 (0)161 275 8051
Galina.Miazhevich@manchester.ac.uk

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For information, please contact Chris Flood or Henri Nickels.
Introduction

The research carried out in this paper emerges from a larger AHRC-funded project examining television news representations of Islam as security threat in Britain, France and Russia. Each of these countries has strong historic connections with Islam. Each is host to large Muslim populations. Each has been involved in military campaigns defined as part of the so-called War on Terror, and has experienced Islamist-inspired terror at first hand. The focus of the analysis has particular relevance to the current post-Cold War geopolitical context of extreme tension and upheaval characterised by asymmetrical warfare, civil disturbance and international terrorism in many parts of the world. A linking thread between many of these conflicts is the presence of Islamism and religiously sanctioned violence as factors which interact with other sources of civil and political upheaval.

The European Union (EU) is at the fulcrum of many of these political changes, and has a crucial role to play in mediating between the various conflicting parties involved. One aspect of the conflict is the strength of identification of European actors in contrast to the Islamic Other, who is increasingly coming to be portrayed as a threat to Western values and ideals. This paper does not explore the truth of such claims. Instead, it argues that a perceived threat is often more ominous than any real threat, and “the fact that an image of the enemy exists does not reveal a priori whether the enemy is real or fictitious” (Hafez, 2000b: 13). It is beyond dispute that recent media coverage of Islam-related violence and conflict has affected the social construction and perception of the Islamic Other.

Of the Member States of the EU, Great Britain and France play prominent roles in defining the agenda on international terrorism, the former as a result of its active involvement with American-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the latter as a result of favouring a more diplomatic approach to conflict resolution. Another key, non-EU, player in the matter is Russia, delicately poised between Europe and Asia, with economic, political and strategic interests that often conflict with those of Britain, France, the EU and the USA. In this context, it is worth noting that, until the fall of Communism, the Soviet Union was the undisputed enemy, which has arguably been replaced by the Islamic threat (e.g. Hippler & Lueg, 1995).

In the complex post-Cold War, geopolitical context, there are good reasons for examining how the news media in Britain, France and Russia portray Islamic Otherness, especially in the light of Poole’s (2006b: 6-7) observation that “content illustrates the norms and values of particular media and the wider society in which it is located. It provides a cultural indicator of conceptualisations of a nation, the ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups”. Further, the
news media, especially television, are the principal means through which the large majority of people are informed about (geo)politics (Philo & Berry, 2006), and in this context they are often the principal source of information on the Islamic Other.

The central aim of the paper is to examine how TV news media in Britain, France and Russia define European identity in relation to Islamic Otherness. Similarities and differences in television news coverage of Islam-related issues on the principal public service broadcasting (PSB) channels of each country are examined in relation to the distinctive characteristics of each, while at the same time pointing towards shared perceptions and representations of the Islamic Other within and outside Europe’s borders.

**Theoretical Framework**

European identity is a complex and variegated concept. Widespread opposition to Turkey’s accession on the grounds of its ‘Muslim’ character illustrates the extent to which Europeanness defines itself by reference to the otherness of ‘Islamic’ societies, even those which lie close to, or within Europe itself. Indeed, as Strâth (2002: 388) argues, when European identity is discussed,

References are made to Europe’s heritage of classical Graeco-Roman civilization, Christianity, and the ideas of the Enlightenment, Science, Reason, Progress and Democracy as the core elements of this claimed European legacy. There are subtexts of racial and cultural chauvinism, particularly when confronted with Islam. Europe acquires distinction and salience when pitted against the Other.

The presumed existence of an Islamic threat is not new (Esposito, 1995; Asad, 1997; Said, 1997; Rich, 1999), and the concept is relevant both to Europe and Russia (Freitag-Wirminghaus, 2000). European fears, and stereotypes of Islam as “violent, fanatical, expansionist and anti-progressive” (Hafez, 2000b: 10), have been reinforced by recent terrorist attacks justified in the name of Islam in New York, London or Madrid (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez Guede, 2007). Events such as these strengthen the notion that values assigned to Islam are “incompatible with ‘modern’ values centered on democracy, personal rights, equality before the law, and tolerance for the views of others” (Emerick, 2001: 13; see also Schulze, 2000). In effect, Islam and the Islamic Other are socially constructed as being in opposition to liberal values central to European identity. As Kurth (2006: 547) argues, “the
principal identity of people in the West, including Europe, is now defined by an ensemble of liberal ideas: (1) liberal democracy; (2) the free market; (3) the open society; and (4) an individualist culture”.

The open society, considered as a precondition for the effective operation of liberal democracy, presupposes a set of normative, ideological values which are nowadays taken to be broadly shared, subject to local variation, across the whole of Europe and large parts of the rest of the world. Of course, the very success and longevity of liberalism as a current of political and social thought has made it particularly diffuse. The precise definition of what its core values are, or of the hierarchy between them, remains an object of debate. The same is true of their translation into the policy objectives of political actors. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to arrive at broad, baseline public statements of which multiple national governments are willing to be signatories. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), summarised in Table 1 below, is one such instance: it offers something fairly close to a consensual articulation of European values and, by extension, the building blocks of European identity.

Russia’s position in relation to these values is equivocal. On the evidence of its constitution, and of other legal and official documents, Russia would appear to adhere to many, if not all, of these values. This is not surprising in light of the fact that most such documents can be traced to the brief period of euphoric enthusiasm for western liberal democracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the status of the legal contract and of the formal, written document in general, has typically carried less weight in Russia (a superficial reading of the Soviet constitution, for example, would reveal similarly enlightened values and respect for free speech). Moreover, despite the sporadic influence on Russian politics of a progressive liberal tradition traceable to 19th Century Westernisers (with whom Gorbachev and the early-period Yeltsyn can be partially associated), this tradition has tended to be overshadowed by authoritarian tendencies distrustful of what has been portrayed as a degenerate West burdened by a legacy of post-Enlightenment rationalism inappropriate to the needs of a country such as Russia.

These tendencies, loosely (if problematically) associated with the Slavophile tradition in Russian thought, have come to the fore again under Putin, whose recent pronouncements have emphasised the need for a strong Russian state, for order, and for loyalty to patriotic values. At the same time, for foreign consumption, Putin’s Russia has adopted a version of what Wilson (2005) has termed ‘virtual democracy’, under which all the trappings of a free, liberal society are maintained (down to the existence of multiple ‘opposition parties’), but in
which real power is wielded by a small, powerful elite. Thus, Russian assertions of commitment to liberal democracy and opposition to Islamic intolerance and authoritarianism have been muted and rare and, when made, intended primarily for Western audiences. This strategy is in keeping, also, with Russia’s newfound enthusiasm for ‘Eurasianism’ (in which Russia’s destiny is to bridge the divide between Christian West and Islamic East), and its paranoid fear of precipitating the loss of its Islamic territories (principally, the North Caucasus and Tatarstan).

Table 1: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIGNITY</th>
<th>FREEDOMS</th>
<th>EQUALITY</th>
<th>SOLIDARITY</th>
<th>CITIZENS’ RIGHTS</th>
<th>JUSTICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human dignity</td>
<td>Right to liberty and security</td>
<td>Equality before the law</td>
<td>Workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking</td>
<td>Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament</td>
<td>Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to life</td>
<td>Respect for private and family life</td>
<td>Non-discrimination</td>
<td>Right of collective bargaining and action</td>
<td>Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections</td>
<td>Presumption of innocence and right of defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to the integrity of the person</td>
<td>Protection of personal data</td>
<td>Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity</td>
<td>Right of access to placement services</td>
<td>Right to good administration</td>
<td>Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment</td>
<td>Right to marry and right to found a family</td>
<td>Equality between men and women</td>
<td>Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal</td>
<td>Right of access to documents</td>
<td>Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of slavery and forced labour</td>
<td>Freedom of thought, conscience and religion</td>
<td>The rights of the child</td>
<td>Fair and just working conditions</td>
<td>Ombudsman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression and information</td>
<td>The rights of the elderly</td>
<td>Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work</td>
<td>Right to petition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of assembly and of association</td>
<td>Integration of persons with disabilities</td>
<td>Family and professional life</td>
<td>Freedom of movement and of residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the arts and sciences</td>
<td>Social security and social assistance</td>
<td>Diplomatic and consular protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to education</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work</td>
<td>Access to services of general economic interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to conduct a business</td>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Right to property</td>
<td>Consumer protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Right to asylum</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The overlap and mutual reinforcement between many of the values listed in Table 1 is reflected in the data analysis. However, while the table outlines a range of values that Islam and, particularly, Islamism are perceived to challenge, it is important to bear in mind that these are ideological values, not absolute truths and that their application as a cognitive framework for judging Islam – or even Islamism – in a climate of polarisation is almost inescapably ethnocentric. As Krämer (2000: 39) observes: “Many Muslims will argue that freedom, equality and responsibility are nothing but the expression of true and unadulterated Islam, which was falsified during the course of history through a combination of error, tyranny and usurpation”.

**PSB in Britain, France and Russia**

PSB and the defence of the public interest are ingrained in European identity, not least because “the system of public broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism” (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997).

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is Britain’s principal PSB organisation, with BBC One being its primary channel. Its relationship with the state is complex and delicate. The organisation claims to be unique, in that it is a public corporation owned by the British people, subject to its Royal Charter, and independent of governmental or commercial influence. As is the case with civil servants in the UK, employees of the BBC are not replaced when a new government comes into power. Whereas it was formerly overseen by a Board of Governors who were themselves, in effect, appointed by the national government, since January 2007 it has been under the authority of the BBC Trust, comprised of twelve members appointed under a public process. The BBC’s funding comes predominantly from the licence fee, a form of indirect tax which accounts for more some 74.1% of its income in 2006/7, with the remainder coming from BBC Commercial Businesses (19.8%) and the World Service (6.1%—percentages extrapolated from BBC, 2007a: 105).

The British government has no direct control over how the licence fee is spent, so long as the BBC obeys national laws and its own regulations. However, since the government sets the level of the licence fee, it is in a position to exert indirect pressure on the BBC, and, of course, government ministers and their spokespersons may let it be known if they consider that the Corporation is straying from its remit – though this can equally backfire on government if the media and public consider that the BBC is being coerced for partisan
political reasons. The BBC’s public service remit is to inform, educate and entertain. Its stated values are to remain “independent, impartial and honest” (BBC, 2007b), while respecting the diversity of peoples living in Britain. The BBC’s financial independence is intended to allow it to defend the public interest and (liberal) values associated with it, such as Truth, Freedom, Liberty, Equality and Tolerance. Strict editorial guidelines are therefore implemented, to act as a binding code of ethics for journalists, editors and programme makers.\(^1\)

French public service television is regulated by the France Télévisions group, with France 2 the principal channel. The entire group’s philosophy is defined on the basis of French law and European regulations and is specified in *cahiers des charges* relative to each channel comprised in the group. France Télévisions’ remit is, to all intents and purposes, the same as that of the BBC. Like BBC One, France 2 is on a sound financial footing, with 57.5% of its income deriving from licence fees, 38.9% from advertising revenue, and the remaining 2.8% from sales and service provision (France Télévisions, 2005). The issue of codes of journalistic practice has been much debated in France since the 1980s, and according to Charon (2004: 73),

> Voices are regularly raised to demand a strengthening of the legal provisions [relating to codes of practice], when they are invoked. Others support the intervention of some authority, whether established by journalists, by the media (a press council) or by the public power (an ethical committee), or alternatively an extension of the powers of existing regulatory authorities … Media professionals (journalists and editors) are largely united in opposition to such a move. Others strive for voluntary and pro-active measures such as the clarification of codes, setting up mediators (ombudsmen) or developing arenas for public debate on public informational practices.

While PSB has a long and healthy tradition in both Britain and France, it is a relative novelty in Russia. “The concept of public service broadcasting as a possible form of television industry was never considered publicly until the year 2000, since state control of television was and still is used to safeguard existing political elites” (Varatnova, 2004: 196).

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\(^1\) In line with the transparency advocated by the BBC, these editorial guidelines are available in full on their website: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/edguide](http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/edguide).
Further, Russia’s nominal public service channel, Channel One (previously known as ORT), is funded by the state, private stakeholders and advertising, and is partly owned by the state (with the Agency for Federal Property Management of the CIS – Rosimushchestvo – owning about 40%, according to an inspection conducted by the Audit Chamber of Russia in 2005), while private stakeholders own 60%. Programming on Channel One is dominated by the entertainment format; there is no strict adherence to PSB principles. Regarding editorial content and journalistic practice, Gorbachev’s “glasnost media policy … guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of expression and abolished censorship” (Varatnova, 2004: 199), although this point needs to be qualified in light of the strong degree of state control over the management of Channel One and over its news reporting (International Press Institute, 2001).

When making the news, journalists pay lip service to codes of practice, such as the one adopted by the Union of Journalists, but the point made above about the façade-like status of the written document in Russian culture needs to be borne in mind here; the principles of ‘virtual democracy’ apply as much to the Russian media as to Russian political culture and, whilst formal censorship no longer applies, Channel One journalists must now conform rigidly to the news agendas handed to them from above, if they are to retain their positions. There has been a partial (though not complete) reversion to Soviet practices in relation to news gathering, editing and reporting, overlaid with the flashy, surface trappings of western-style 24-hour news programming.

**Methodology**

A bottom-up, comparative, qualitative analysis of Islam-related news discourse was implemented to assess how European identity was defined in contrast to Islamic Otherness in the flagship television new programmes on Britain’s BBC One (10 o’clock News), Russia’s Channel One (Vremia), and France 2 (Journal de 20 Heures). News discourse was analysed from the perspective of framing theory, operationalised on the basis of theoretical and methodological insights derived from Goffman (1974), Gitlin (1981), Gamson (1992), Entman (1993), and Nickels (2007). In addition, based on Hall’s (1980) model of encoding/decoding, news stories are assumed to be polysemous, i.e. they can be interpreted in more ways than one. Regarding the polysemous nature of discourse, Flowerdew (1999: 1096) observes that,

> Our lives as analysts…would be made infinitely simpler if we could place our trust in some sort of code or conduit model of communication based upon the belief that
perfect understanding is achieved by the precise articulation of a message by an encoder and the exact decoding of this message by a decoder. Communication is imprecise, [however,] involving inferential processes which communicators derive from the context of the utterances provided.

Despite uncertainties regarding the intended meaning of communications, it remains possible to study news discourse in a systematic manner. The following six questions were thus applied to every news story in the data set – described in detail later – thereby providing a comprehensive overview of how European identity is defined in relation to Islamic Otherness:

1. What is the perceived nature of Islamic Otherness in relation to European identity?
2. What is the perceived scope of Islamic Otherness in relation to European identity?
3. What are the perceived origins of Islamic Otherness in relation to European identity?
4. What are the perceived social implications of Islamic Otherness in relation to European identity?
5. What are the perceived moral implications of Islamic Otherness in relation to European identity?
6. What recommendations are made as to how Islamic Otherness should be dealt with?

The British and French sources showed strong similarities of viewpoint, and the Russian ones a mixture of similarities and significant differences.

**Case Studies: European Identity and Islamic Otherness**

Two categories of news stories were chosen for analysis. The first category consists of instances of *Us against Them*, and comprises stories relating to perceived challenges posed by Islamic Otherness to European values, as highlighted in Table 1, above:

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2 See Appendix 1 for more details on the sample of analysed stories.
Sectarianism in the context of the sentencing and hanging of Saddam Hussein. The values challenged in these stories relate to Dignity and Justice, with particular reference to the preservation of human dignity; the right to life; the right to the integrity of the person; the prohibition of degrading treatment; and the right to a fair trial.

Caricatures of the Prophet. The values challenged in these stories relate to Freedom(s) and Justice, with particular reference to the right to liberty and security; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; the right to a fair trial; the presumption of innocence; and principles of proportionality of criminal offences and penalties.

Islamic clothing. The values challenged in these stories relate to Equality, particularly between men and women.

The second category of stories consists of instances of Us with Them, where the media can be thought of as engaging in a dialogue with Islam. This category includes stories relating to:

- The Hajj pilgrimage. The values promoted in these stories relate to Freedom(s), particularly freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
- Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to Turkey in November 2006. The values promoted in these stories relate to Freedom(s), particularly freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

Figure 1: Percentage of Islam-Related News Stories and News Time, Nov 2006 - Jan 2007
Islam-related stories occupied a significant portion of news coverage on all three channels, as can be seen in Figure 1. Between 1 November 2006 and 31 January 2007, the 10 o’clock News devoted about 28% of its total news time to them, Vremia about 13%, and the Journal de 20 Heures about 7%. The relative salience of the analysed stories varied greatly across the three channels, as Table 2 and Figure 2, below, show. While France 2 covered the largest number of stories, they were the shortest on average, and Channel One covered the least, but, on average, they were the longest, followed closely by those on BBC One. This suggests that these two channels covered the relevant news stories in more depth than France 2.

Table 2: Relative Salience of the Analysed Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>10 o’clock News</th>
<th>Vremia</th>
<th>Journal de 20 Heures</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Story Length</td>
<td>03:07</td>
<td>03:19</td>
<td>02:26</td>
<td>02:57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Running Order</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Stories</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Stories</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headline News</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Case Studies

Almost three quarters of stories on France 2 and about two thirds of those on Channel One were headline news (i.e. the equivalent of front page news in a newspaper), as opposed to little more than a third on BBC One. This suggests that the relative salience of the coverage was lower on the BBC than on the other channels. The ratio of international vs. national stories is indicative of the nature and prioritisation of news coverage: the more
international stories there are, the less significant (on a local level) the issue becomes. Channel One covered the relevant stories from the perspective of international news, while BBC One and France 2 devoted about a third of their news time to domestic issues. It must be noted, however, that the cartoon protest stories on BBC One and France 2 related to nationally relevant court cases for which there were no Russian equivalent.

When viewed from the perspective of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the case studies reveal how European identity was defined in reaction to Islamic Otherness on BBC One, Channel One and France 2. The Russian perspective, reflecting a characteristic ambivalence towards European values and Europeanness, is somewhat different.

Dignity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIGNITY</th>
<th>Human dignity</th>
<th>Right to life</th>
<th>Right to the integrity of the person</th>
<th>Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The sentencing and hanging of Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity was described as a political disaster on all three channels, for three reasons. First, images of the hanging illicitly captured by mobile phone were circulated across Iraq and the world. Second, these images (repeated on all three channels) showed Saddam Hussein (a Sunni) being taunted by (Shiite) executioners chanting “Moqtada! Moqtada! Moqtada!” – the name of the Shiite clerical leader described by France 2 as his sworn enemy. Third, this taunting is portrayed as exacerbating sectarian divisions and “tribal sectarian violence”. As a result, the hanging and its aftermath were depicted as being “deplorable”, “totally unacceptable”, a “mistake”, “a complete unmitigated disaster”, and as “sectarian justice”.

Some positive evaluations of the sentencing and hanging of Saddam Hussein did appear in British and French news, but, in most cases, these stemmed from implacably unforgiving Shiites. On France 2, European (esp. French) opposition to the death penalty was emphasised: “France, which wishes to introduce the abolition of the death penalty in its Constitution, has taken note of the execution … According to Great Britain, Saddam Hussein

3 31/12/2006: Inhumation de Saddam Hussein.
4 BBC One, 29/12/2006, Saddam Execution.
5 John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister, BBC One, 02/01/2007, Saddam Execution.
7 Sami al-Askari, Iraqi Government Advisor, BBC One, 02/01/2007, Saddam Executed.
8 John Simpson, World Affairs Editor, BBC One, 03/01/2007, Saddam Executed.
9 BBC One, 02/01/2007, Saddam Execution.
paid [for his crimes]. For Moscow, the event could aggravate the situation”.10 Moscow’s fears proved to be well founded, and while American, British and Iraqi authorities were harbouring hopes that the sentencing and hanging of Saddam Hussein would solve many of the problems facing Iraq, all three channels agreed that they only contributed to making a bad situation worse.

Evaluating the execution “depends like everything else does now in this utterly divided country on who you are, what you are allegiances are. Sunnis, bitterly unhappy, feeling that they've lost their standard bearer. Shiites, delighted”.11 The execution compounded existing sectarian divisions and reinforced the cycle of violence, leading to “revenge attacks”12 targeting both Sunnis and Shiites, perpetrated with improvised explosive devices such as cars, trucks or motorbikes rigged with explosives. The intensity of news visuals associated with sectarian violence is most vividly captured in France 2’s reportage: “Burnt out cars, shredded corpses, the howling of the injured and the tears of the survivors. Every day, in Iraq, dozens of attacks average hundreds of deaths, to which summary executions must be added. A true civil war illustrating the terrible division of a country ravaged by confessional violence”.13

All three channels assign part of the blame for increases in sectarian violence to the American military, which, at best, is represented as being overrun and, at worst, as incompetent: “The Americans. They have already lost 3,000 men in Iraq. Incapable of stopping the violence, they are now massively rejected [by Iraqis]. If they leave the country, the civil war gets worse; if they stay, they can only get beaten up”.14 The exacerbation of sectarian divisions and violence that resulted from the trial, sentencing and hanging of Saddam Hussein is repeatedly portrayed as the ultimate expression of the counterproductive nature of the military campaign in Iraq and of the ill-preparedness of the American-British invasion. This is especially true of Channel One’s coverage, where Russia’s previous claim to a place in the war on international terrorism has given way to almost unconcealed, paranoid, anti-Western and anti-American sentiment. As a result, Saddam Hussein’s death sentence was presented as being unfair and tragic,15 leading to him becoming a martyr.

Channel One squarely assigns responsibility for increased sectarian violence to the Americans, without whose military operation the trial would never have taken place. In fact,
Channel One notes ironically that their military operation caused the death of thousands of Shiites, which the American military was trying to protect. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein was depicted as the father of (at least a third of) the nation and as having the ability to keep sectarianism in check, thereby outweighing his wrongdoings. The end result of this American-backed execution was to leave Iraq “on the verge of dissolution”, and fostering a climate of such chaos that Iraqis became fearful for their lives when leaving home. Even the emblematic image of the statue of Saddam Hussein being pulled down was accompanied by anti-American rhetoric.

**Freedoms and Justice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FREEDOMS</th>
<th>JUSTICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right to liberty and security</td>
<td>Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of thought, conscience and religion</td>
<td>Presumption of innocence and right of defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression and information</td>
<td>Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding liberty and security, a perceived Islamic threat pervades news coverage on the British, French and – to a lesser extent – Russian channels. It relates to what is portrayed as a security risk inherent in the Violent Islamic Other. Although this multifaceted risk is most clearly articulated in stories relating to caricatures of the Prophet and the Pope’s visit to Turkey, it reverberates across the range of analysed stories, just as the theme of Justice does.

Coverage of the Pope’s visit to Turkey was dominated by two issues: security risks and the Pope’s efforts at inter-religious reconciliation. Although the BBC devotes much of its three news stories to the Pope’s bridge-building efforts, the security threat posed by the Violent Islamic Other prefaced his arrival: “Pope Benedict has started an historic visit to Turkey. There are tough security measures in place after protests by Muslim groups against his presence. Many were angered by his recent remarks which appeared to link Islam with violence. But today the Pope spoke of the need for authentic dialogue between Christians and Muslims”. While the Pope’s conciliatory intention may have emanated from his realisation that comments he made relating Islam to violence were offensive to Muslims, his efforts are

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16 30/12/2006, Саддам Хусейн казнен.
defined in the news coverage more in terms of placating the Violent Islamic Other. This is especially true of France 2, which otherwise remains relatively neutral in its coverage of Islam-related news.

When it comes to opposition to Turkey, however, there appears to be an almost visceral negative reaction on the part of the French, paralleling France’s steadfast opposition to Turkey’s accession to the EU. Thus the Pope’s arrival in what is repeatedly described as a “land of Islam” (terre d’islam) is framed in terms of “appeasement”. The Pope’s visit to the Blue Mosque is described as an “unexpected, exceptional and historic” gesture, even if the newsreader did relay a clarification from the Vatican to the effect that the Pope had not prayed but meditated at the mosque, suggesting that some bridges would not be built. Nevertheless, the reporter feels emboldened to state that “never before has a Pope extended this far in the direction of the Muslim world. Never before has a Pope made so many good-will gestures”. In other words, the Pope is portrayed as having extended an olive branch to the Muslim world, and it is up to Muslims to make (their) peace with Christians and, by extension, the West, suggesting that it would be remiss for Muslims not to accept the Pope’s good will.

On Channel One, a leading role is given to Europe’s ability for intercultural dialogue. This ability is illustrated by the Pope’s richly symbolic visit to multi-faith Turkey (Muslim, Christian and Orthodox), the aim of which is described as promoting cultural and religious tolerance and dialogue among all the communities represented in Turkey. Despite Turkey’s constitutionally enshrined secular status, BBC One and France 2 firmly placed Turkey in the Islamic world, reporting that between 98 and 99% of its population is Muslim. Mark Mardell, the BBC’s Europe Editor, even describes Turkey as being “overwhelmingly Muslim” and succumbing to “passionate rage” during anti-Pope demonstrations, with the implication that the population is given to irrational behaviour. Similarly, France 2’s coverage refers to “radical Muslims shouting all their hatred of Benedict XVI for hours on end”. The consequence of this rage is that “there will be tighter security around the Pope than there was around President Bush when he came to Turkey. The authorities have reason to be anxious”.

Not content with labelling it as terre d’islam, the following ominous portrait of Turkey is painted on France 2: “Istanbul. Former capital of the Ottoman Empire. Mosques

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in their hundreds. Muslim for the last six centuries. Since the fall of Constantinople. In this Islamist neighbourhood of Fatih, one gets the impression that the spirit of the Crusades lives on”. This type of reporting reinforces perceptions of Islam and Muslims as a security risk, not only on a symbolic level, but also on a very real physical level – making it necessary for the Pope to be “whisked through the streets in an armour-plated Mercedes” – illustrated with news visuals of hate-filled protesters, burning flags, “storming” or “marching on” Danish embassies.

The Violent Islamic Other is much less present on Channel One news. However, during the Pope’s visit, Istanbul’s chief of police was compelled to reassure viewers that the cultural value of Turkish hospitality guaranteed a peaceful visit. Further, even if security measures surrounding the Pope’s visit were described as “unprecedented”, the number of protesters was presented as nominal. In fact, overt portrayals of a Violent Islamic Other occurred only twice in the entire Russian data set: once in relation to the execution of Saddam Hussein, where celebrating Shiites were shown waving machine guns; the other in footage of Charlie Hebdo (a satirical French newspaper sued for publishing caricatures of the Prophet), where crowds of angry protesters were shown chanting, shoving one another and burning flags. Overall, Channel One downplays the threat of the Violent Islamic Other, presenting it as minor, manageable or rendered distant (i.e. sectarian violence in Iraq and protests against caricatures of the Prophet happened at a safe distance from Russia).

The single BBC story relating to Islamic clothing was unequivocally framed in terms of security risks, questioning how a murder suspect could flee the UK dressed in a full veil while travelling on his sister’s passport. Not only did the story depict wearing the veil as a very real security threat, it also constituted scathing criticism of the British security apparatus: “This was the wanted poster of him [Mustaf Jamma, the veiled fugitive] Police issued last year. It was plastered all over the media and police stations and, presumably, sent to immigration at airports. But detectives believe he may still have managed to escape through Heathrow wearing a woman’s veil … but how on earth is that possible?”

Still in relation to security, Muslim expansionism emerges as a theme in news coverage of the Hajj, with both BBC One and France 2 emphasising the “millions of pil-

26 France 2, 06/02/2007, Caricatures de Mahomet, procès à Paris.
27 BBC One, 03/11/2006, Protest Charges.
30 20/12/2006, Murder Suspect.
grims” undertaking it, a phrase often repeated on both channels. In classic journalistic usage of aquatic metaphors, pilgrims are referred to as “a sea of white”,31 “a sea of devotion”32 or “a veritable human tide”,33 thereby connoting the perceived expansive nature of Islam. Also, according to France 2, the number of pilgrims is growing “exponentially”34 every year and their message is described as sometimes being more political than religious: “We wish for the great victory of Allah in the world, and the great victory in Palestine, in Iraq, in all Muslim countries. We wish for peace for all of us”,35 where us refers to Muslims. The underlying reference here is to the resurgence of the Caliphate and the threat that this poses to the non-Islamic world and, by extension, Europe. The strength of Muslim faith is reinforced on France 2, highlighting the religious zeal and fervour of pilgrims gathered on and around Mount Arafat.36 The visuals used to cover the Hajj on BBC One and France 2 echo the expansionist theme, consisting of images of immense crowds of Muslims circumambulating the Kaaba, climbing Mount Arafat, or kneeling in prayer in unison. The net effect of these images is that the spectacle “shows us the gatheredness [sic] and the unity of all Muslims”.37

Crowd control (or rather the lack of it) is also brought up in relation to the Hajj, with both channels recounting that hundreds of people die every year at the pilgrimage due to, among others, stampedes. According to the BBC, “it is arguable that whatever measures are in place in the five days ahead to prevent accidents, complete crowd control on this scale is probably impossible”.38 Hence, the reinforcement of security measures is emphasised in the Journal de 20 Heures. France 2 introduces another dimension to uncontrollability, initiating coverage of the Hajj with a story about pilgrims stranded at Roissy airport as a result of falling foul of “covetous travel agents”, “touts” and “crooks”, even including some imams.39 This course of events is portrayed as a yearly occurrence: “Hours of waiting, flights delayed for several days or cancelled, visas that are not ready. Every year, these scenes are repeated in French airports during the period of the pilgrimage to Mecca”.40

31 BBC One, 28/12/2006, Hajj Pilgrimage.
32 BBC One, 29/12/2006, Hajj Pilgrimage.
33 France 2, 29/12/2006, Pèlerinage à la Mecque.
34 28/12/2006, Pèlerinage à La Mecque.
35 Egyptian pilgrim, 29/12/2006, Pèlerinage à La Mecque.
36 29/12/2006, Pèlerinage à La Mecque.
37 Pilgrim, BBC One, 28/12/2006, Hajj Pilgrimage.
38 BBC One, 28/12/2006, Hajj Pilgrimage.
39 28/12/2006, La Mecque, des pèlerins bloqués à Roissy.
40 28/12/2006, La Mecque, des pèlerins bloqués à Roissy.
All three channels covered trials relating to the publication of caricatures of the Prophet in terms of freedom of expression, particularly free speech. Each channel emphasised different issues, with BBC One pointing to the boundaries of free speech, France 2 focusing on its Republican character, and Channel One highlighting its compatibility with Russian values.

By focusing on the boundaries of free speech, the BBC directly touched upon a central aspect of the Paradox of Liberalism: what limits should a liberal democracy bound by the rule of law set on tolerance of those who are themselves intolerant and contemptuous of the freedom of others? While Muslim demonstrators on trial claimed they were doing nothing more than simply exercising their right to free speech when brandishing incendiary placards (e.g. “Behead those who insult Islam”), or calling for the death of British, Americans and Danes, the prosecution was adamant that “freedom … does not extend to the right to encourage murder or incite racial hatred”. Further, the trial of Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party (BNP), on charges of inciting racial hatred – after, among other things, Griffin had called Islam a “wicked, vicious faith” and had defended his choice of words on the grounds of “common sense” and “freedom of speech”, while wearing the Blue Ribbon of the Online Free Speech Campaign sponsored by the Electronic Frontier Foundation – led official figures such as the Lord Chancellor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to question whether new legislation should be introduced to curb or prevent abuses of free speech.

However, while Muslim demonstrators were charged with inciting racial hatred, Nick Griffin was acquitted, after the court had found his comments merely “offensive”. According to the BBC, “the difference between causing offence and inciting hatred is of course what the courts must decide … It is worth remembering that earlier this year the Pope caused huge offence after quoting a 14th century emperor who described the words of Mohammed as "evil and inhuman". So, should such phrases be illegal, or might that stifle debate?" Of course, the BBC did not answer its own question. Nevertheless, on another occasion it did represent the Muslim standpoint, according to which statements such as Griffin’s increase Islamophobia, and should therefore not be permitted.

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41 05/01/2007, Cartoons Verdict.
42 09/11/2006, Racial Hatred; 05/01/2007, Cartoons Verdict.
France 2 coverage of the trial of *Charlie Hebdo* for slander – instigated by two of France’s largest Muslim organisations – focused on issues relating to defending free speech and the free press. Although the trial took place during the 2007 French presidential election campaign, the fact that mainstream political actors (e.g. Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande, François Bayrou) stated at various times – during and at the trial – that free speech is a fundamental, unalienable (and, in the case of Sarkozy, intrinsically French) right cannot solely be imputed to electioneering. According to France 2, putting *Charlie Hebdo* on trial constitutes a straightforward societal debate between upholding free speech and respecting religious beliefs.\(^49\) In an echo of the BBC’s coverage, the newsreader asks: “So, slander or freedom of speech? The judges will decide again where the yellow line is drawn that cannot be crossed”.\(^50\) Hence, defining the boundaries of free speech is also an underlying theme in France 2 coverage of Muslim anger, which goes one step further than the BBC’s, asking whether “respect due to the spiritual guide can be accommodated with free speech”.\(^51\)

Philippe Val (editor of *Charlie Hebdo*) can be said to have captured the mood of the (political) nation when, upon being acquitted, he said: “It is good news for secular and Republican Muslims. It is good news for those who believe in freedom of speech. It is good news when one thinks that [freedom of speech] is necessary to the functioning of states bound by the rule of law”.\(^52\) It is notable that a tolerant, moderate Muslim Other, respectful of French values, is posited in this statement, and that this type of Muslim is acceptable to French society.

It is also striking that the first news story relating to the trial on the *Journal de 20 Heures* recounted how other cases of slander involving perceived denigration of religion were dealt with in France.\(^53\) Mostly, the prosecution lost or disagreements were settled out of court, with the alleged guilty party retracting the item that caused offence. In another echo of BBC news, Muslims are given a voice in the *Journal de 20 Heures*, expressing their discontent at how abuse of free speech by non-Muslims can lead to increases in Islamophobia, “to fanning the flames”,\(^54\) especially at a time of heightened international tension. However, unlike their British Muslim counterparts, who were calling for death and destruction in retaliation for caricatures of the Prophet, the rector of the Paris Mosque advised a legal approach,

\(^{48}\) 07/02/2007, *Nicolas Sarkozy soutient Charlie Hebdo*.

\(^{49}\) 06/02/2007, *Caricatures de Mahomet, procès à Paris*.

\(^{50}\) 06/02/2007, *Caricatures de Mahomet, procès à Paris*.

\(^{51}\) 08/02/2007, *Charlie Hebdo, deuxième jour de procès*.

\(^{52}\) 22/03/2007, *Procès des Caricatures de Mahomet, une relaxe*.

\(^{53}\) 06/02/2007, *Caricatures de Mahomet, procès à Paris*.

\(^{54}\) 08/02/2007, *Charlie Hebdo, deuxième jour de procès*. 
encouraging Muslims to revert to court “when there are verbal or caricatural acts of aggression … or other forms, towards Muslims”.55

Channel One’s treatment of the acquittal of Charlie Hebdo aligns Russian values with European values, emphasising shared respect for free speech, even if it was reinterpreted in terms of “freedom to laugh”.56 While emphasising the social value of free speech, the futility of this particular court case was emphasised: “the plaintiff is getting angry in vain, as the outcome of the court case was clear from the very beginning”.57

**Equality**

Equality is mostly framed in terms of sexual inequalities between men and women in Islam, where the former are portrayed as being dominant/dominating and the latter as subordinate/submissive. News coverage of the Hajj and Islamic clothing are partly framed in these terms, although the Hajj did provide the BBC with an opportunity to emphasise positive aspects of Islam, noting that Muslims “embrace a message of equality and humility”.58 Islam is also described as a “rainbow faith”,59 discrediting the myth of Islamic sexual inequality: “The essence of this day for Muslims is to pray to God for forgiveness of sins committed. But it is also a day when equality before God is potently displayed. Preconceptions that Islam equals the segregation of sexes will find men and women side-by-side”.60 In a somewhat similar vein, the Pope’s visit to Turkey allowed Channel One to portray the Islamic Other positively, demonstrating the openness of the Muslim cultural heritage, rooted in hospitality and generosity.

Sexual inequality was more explicitly raised in coverage of the Pope’s visit to Turkey in the *Journal de 20 Heures*. Female anti-Pope protesters were referred to as being “parked in a corner”, while only men were allowed on stage, encouraging demonstrators “to fight the

55 06/02/2007, *Caricatures de Mahomet, procès à Paris.*
56 22/03/2007, *Голландия: предложения о запрете паранджи.*
57 22/03/2007, *Голландия: предложения о запрете паранджи.*
infidels”, thereby emphasising male domination over female submission, as well as Islamic security risks and expansionism. The theme of sexual inequality is reinforced in coverage of the Hajj: “This year, women represent 45% of pilgrims; a novelty in this religion that does not always give pride of place to [women]. Completely covered, except for their hands and faces, they repeat the ritual formulae”. This excerpt suggests that near-equality in numbers does not necessarily amount to equality in status, depicting Muslim women as passive and submissive, as if stuck in Tradition (vs. Modernity), mechanically going through the motions.

Tensions between Tradition and Modernity are a central theme in France 2’s coverage of Islamic clothing. In a story recounting how Muslim women in Preston North End (Northern England) are allowed to wear a “surgical burqa” while in hospital, wearing the veil is framed as not necessarily contradicting Modernity. The stated aim of the story was to question whether wearing a burqa is compatible with dispensing health care. The answer was a strong yes, endorsed by doctors and nurses, whether they were Muslim or not. It is notable that the story concludes by questioning British values: “The hospital … is located in a county where 20% of Muslims live. This community obviously didn’t appreciate the recent dismissal of a school teacher because she was wearing a full veil. Paradoxically, the outfit proposed by the hospital didn’t stir up any debate. This initiative shows that English-style multiculturalism remains the rule here. It is out of the question to ruffle cultural and religious freedoms, despite the recent controversy surrounding wearing the full veil”. This last remark refers to the national outcry provoked by Jack Straw’s comments on the inappropriateness of wearing the full veil”. The subtext here is that of an intolerant,

This controversy reverberated across Europe, leading France 2 to predict success for a Dutch proposal to ban burqas and full veils from public spaces, which the French broadcaster attributed to the far right in the Netherlands. Despite its factual inaccuracy (the proposal actually emanated from Rita Verdonk, the firebrand, right-leaning Interior Minister), the significance of the story lies in its characterisation of a toughening up of Dutch tolerance: “It is a strong symbol because the country was presented until recently as the land of all tolerances. Since the death of Theo van Gogh, assassinated by an Islamist two years ago, the [political] climate has hardened markedly”. The subtext here is that of an intolerant,
backward, Violent Islamic Other who assassinated a freethinking film-maker critical of Islam, thereby committing an attack on modernist, liberal, European values.

Channel One’s coverage of this proposed ban falls within official Russian discourse promoting multiculturalism and tolerance, and mocks what it portrays as inconsistent Western political correctness. This disdain is reflected in jocular reporting, where a Muslim husband is quoted as follows, in response to the suggestion that he beats his wife: “Of course, every day! What, you believed me? I’m sick of all these conversations about the burqa!”

Further, the newsreader concludes the story by suggesting that visitors to Amsterdam should exclude face-covering headgear such as crash helmets or ski masks from their luggage. The image of the female Muslim in Russian news conveys a sense of ordinariness and moderation, with veiled women shown walking in the streets, all in hijab (none in burqa), some with babies in prams. The footage depicts an everyday life to which Russian viewers can relate. This is in line with the official state position on Muslims, which downplays difference and normalises relations with indigenous Islamic populations.

France 2 imbues Islamic clothing with backward qualities, as its reporting of a revival of veil-wearing in Tunisia shows, where “for years, women went around with their heads uncovered, but apparently a page is turning there too”. The story recalls how Habib Bourgiba, then president of Tunisia, “modernised Islam with symbolic gestures” such as removing veils from women more than 50 years ago – a claim supported by archival newsreel footage showing him performing such acts with liberated women smiling back at him in appreciation. At the same time, the recent growth in veil-wearing is interpreted as a fashion statement, an identity marker, “but above all, a religious affair”, with the veil even being referred to as sectarian clothing. The Theological Institute provides the backdrop of the story, where women in Western-style clothes (Modernists) and women wearing headscarves (Traditionalists) are interviewed and pitted against each other.

While Modernists are portrayed as defining religious practice as a personal matter, Traditionalists are portrayed as defining it as a Koranic obligation. They are also defined as being on the losing end in the long run: “The image that wearing this veil gives… It means that your daughter will not get the opportunities you have had. And you can be sure that she will not have access to schooling.”

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authorities hope to keep an image of Tunisia as a “modern Muslim state”, where women wearing the veil will remain a minority on Tunis’ equivalent of the Champs Elysés.

**Conclusion**

The analysis of BBC One, Channel One and France 2 news coverage of sectarianism in Iraq, caricatures of the Prophet, Islamic clothing, the Hajj pilgrimage and the Pope’s visit to Turkey reveal the large extent how European identity is defined in relation to Islamic Otherness. While Channel One tends to emphasise Russianness over Europeanness, BBC One and France 2 portray the Islamic Other as challenging European values, especially Dignity, Freedom(s), Equality and Justice. While most attention was given to perceived violations of the rights to security and free speech by Muslims, four dimensions of Islamic Otherness can be identified in the news:

1. Their violent, anti-liberal Islamism vs. Our peace-building, liberal values.
2. Their intolerance of free speech vs. Our respect for free speech.
3. Their racial hatred vs. Our respect of diversity.
4. Their sectarianism and mutual loathing vs. Our secularism and respect for one another.

Each of these dimensions emphasises differences between Us and Them, between Our values and Their values, reinforcing a societal process of othering or, as some would say, ‘demonising’, the Islamic Other. Within this framework, prominence is given to an Other whose backward and destructive values are at odds with progressive and constructive values adhered to by EU Member States and Russia. The othering process serves to separate **bad Muslims** from **good Muslims**, and “the ‘Muslim community’ with which Western governments are trying to engage does not contain the likes of al-Qaeda. These people may still be perceived to be Muslim but by their actions they have set themselves outside the community” (Volpi, 2007: 462).

While there is a large degree of agreement between the news representation of Islamic Otherness on BBC One and France 2, Channel One adopts a somewhat different perspective. Russian news depictions of the Muslim world do not deal with a Self-Other dyad, but rather with a triad of Russian Self, Western Other, and Islamic Other. Western Others are increasingly coming to be portrayed negatively, with the Islamic Other mediating between the Western Other and the Russian Self. This is consistent with Russian history (it can be
argued that, having been occupied by Muslims for two centuries, Russia has internalised some aspects of the Tatar Other), Russia’s current emphasis on Eurasian identity, its fear of stoking ethnic tensions between Christian and Muslim Russians, and with its need to portray a normalised Chechnya.

To conclude, this paper has shown that a Violent Islamic Other pervades British and French news coverage. There is considerably less evidence for its presence in Russian news, and when it does surface, this is often attributable to Channel One’s failure to incorporate western news footage it purchases into its own discursive system. In Britain and France, this Other is defined in opposition to liberal (European) values, and would more properly be referred to as a Violent Islamist Other. The preponderance of this Other in the news in comparison to ‘moderate Muslims’ – a category that inherently posits a non-moderate opposite – stems in part from news values and their bias towards conflict. In this respect, television news coverage cannot properly be said to be anti-Islamic. Rather, the reported world is subordinate to news values, and Islamic extremism provides a well of conflict and negativity that fits neatly within the 24-hour news cycle.
Bibliography


### Table 1: Sectarianism and Saddam Hussein

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Front Page News (Order of Appearance)</th>
<th>International / National News</th>
<th>Running Order</th>
<th>Story Title</th>
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### Table 2: Caricatures of the Prophet

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<td>Murder suspect</td>
<td>02:51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Hajj Pilgrimage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Front Page News (Order of Appearance)</th>
<th>International / National News</th>
<th>Running Order</th>
<th>Story Title</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBC One</td>
<td>09/12/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Two British Muslims killed in a car accident</td>
<td>00:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 2</td>
<td>18/12/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mecca : pilgrims stranded in Roissy</td>
<td>02:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC One</td>
<td>28/12/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>haj pilgrimage</td>
<td>02:10</td>
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<td>France 2</td>
<td>28/12/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pilgrimage to Mecca</td>
<td>00:14</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC One</td>
<td>29/12/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>haj pilgrimage</td>
<td>01:49</td>
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<td>France 2</td>
<td>29/12/06</td>
<td>Yes (4)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Pilgrimage to Mecca</td>
<td>01:21</td>
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Table 5: Pope in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Front Page News (Order of Appearance)</th>
<th>International / National News</th>
<th>Running Order</th>
<th>Story Title</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France 2</td>
<td>26/11/06</td>
<td>Yes (3)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turkey : demonstration against the Pope’s visit</td>
<td>01:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 2</td>
<td>26/11/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Antioch (Turkey): cradle of the Christians</td>
<td>02:39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC One</td>
<td>27/11/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pope Visit</td>
<td>02:47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 2</td>
<td>27/11/06</td>
<td>Yes (5)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Pope begins a visit to Turkey on Tuesday</td>
<td>02:27</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC One</td>
<td>28/11/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pope in turkey</td>
<td>03:02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Channel One</td>
<td>28/11/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Pope arrived in Turkey</td>
<td>02:46</td>
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<td>28/11/06</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>The Pope’s visit to Turkey</td>
<td>02:06</td>
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<tr>
<td>France 2</td>
<td>29/11/06</td>
<td>Yes (4)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Benedict XVI in Turkey: the Pope celebrated mass in Ephesus</td>
<td>01:27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC One</td>
<td>30/11/06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pope Benedict at the Blue Mosque</td>
<td>00:19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>I</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Penultimate day of the Pope’s visit to Turkey (Blue Mosque visit)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 2</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Symbolic visit by the Pope in Istanbul</td>
<td>01:57</td>
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