Dr Mikey Biddlestone

Prebunking can be used to pre-emptively refute conspiracy narratives. We developed a new approach to prebunking - fighting fire with fire - which introduces a plausible 'meta-conspiracy' suggesting that conspiracy theories are deliberately spread as part of a wider conspiracy. In two preregistered intervention studies, prebunking specific COVID-19 vaccine (Study 1, N = 720) and climate change (Study 2, N = 1077) conspiracy theories (e.g. that climate change is a hoax), with or without this meta-conspiracy framing, did not reduce beliefs in these specific conspiracy theories. However, some notable findings emerged. First, both fighting fire with fire and standard prebunking (Study 2) increased belief in plausible meta-conspiracies that questioned the original specific conspiracy theories. Second, across both studies, specific conspiracy beliefs negatively predicted behavioural intentions, while beliefs in meta-conspiracies positively predicted them. Third, specific conspiracy beliefs were negatively related to belief in plausible meta-conspiracies in both intervention studies (cf: Pilot Study). While this approach did not reduce specific conspiracy beliefs, it increased beliefs that were negatively associated with them and which were positively linked to behavioural intentions. We discuss these null effects and their implications for effective prebunking among conspiracy believers.

Recent empirical and theoretical developments suggest that endorsement of conspiracy theories can arise from the frustration of social motives. Taking this further, the current review integrates theorising on processes relating to three selves-the individual, relational, and collective self and outlines their associations with conspiracy beliefs. In doing so, we argue that motives pertaining to the individual self (e.g., narcissism, need for uniqueness) are linked to belief in conspiracy theories to deflect blame from personal shortcomings and protect the self-image. Motives responding to threats to the relational self (e.g., social exclusion) increase endorsement of conspiracy theories to regain a sense of social support through exchanging shared concerns. Finally, collective self motives (e.g., collective narcissism, perceived ingroup victimhood) foster conspiracy beliefs to defend the group image by blaming outgroups for ingroup misfortunes and placing one's group in a morally superior victim role. Taken together, endorsement of conspiracy theories appears to be borne out of attempts to manage these three selves. Potential consequences for each of the selves, future directions, and theoretical implications are discussed.

Conspiracy theories typically accuse national governments and other powerful groups of secret and malevolent actions. However, conspiracy theories also exist at the level of local politics. In two studies focusing on local community issues in the United Kingdom-the building of a pedestrian plaza in a small seaside town and the establishment of a low emission traffic zone in London-we examined the variables associated with conspiracy beliefs about local political issues. Although the two types of conspiracy beliefs had some unique correlates, common correlates were lower feelings of efficacy about local politics, more anger about the relevant issue, and higher belief in other conspiracy theories. Local political conspiracy beliefs were not associated with intentions to engage in normative or non-normative political actions. We conclude that although conspiracy theories exist in local politics and correlate with a range of psychological factors, they are not necessarily linked to political action.

Research suggests that emerging information about infection‐acquired COVID‐19 immunity should be interpreted with caution. The introduction of “immunity passports” that would enable people who have recovered from COVID‐19 to travel freely and return to work may therefore have detrimental consequences if not managed carefully. In two studies, we examined how perceived (suspected or imagined) recovery from COVID‐19, and the concept of immunity passports, influence people’s intentions to engage in behaviors aimed to reduce the spread of COVID‐19. We also consider ways to lessen potential negative effects. In Study 1 (N = 1604), participants asked to imagine that they had recovered from COVID‐19 reported lower social distancing intentions compared to a control condition. Participants who suspected (versus imagined) that they had recovered from past infection did not report lower preventative intentions compared to the control condition, even at high levels of certainty of past infection. In Study 2 (N = 1732), introducing the idea of immunity passports also reduced social distancing intentions compared to a control condition. The latter effect was, however, attenuated when cautious information about the equivocal science on COVID‐19 was also presented to participants. Participants who suspected that they had COVID‐19 in the past (compared to the control condition) revealed a similar pattern of results, but only at higher levels of certainty of past infection. Caution regarding infection‐acquired COVID‐19 immunity and immunity passports will be crucial in the COVID‐19 response. Implications for premature pandemic announcements, as well as their potential remedies, are discussed.

The current study investigated cultural and psychological factors associated with intentions to reduce the spread of COVID‐19. Participants (n = 704) completed measures of individualism–collectivism, belief in conspiracy theories about COVID‐19, feelings of powerlessness, and intentions to engage in behaviours that reduce the spread of COVID‐19. Results revealed that vertical individualism negatively predicted intentions to engage in social distancing, directly and indirectly through both belief in COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and feelings of powerlessness. Vertical collectivism positively predicted social distancing intentions directly. Horizontal collectivism positively predicted social distancing intentions indirectly through feelings of powerlessness. Finally, horizontal collectivism positively predicted hygiene‐related intentions both directly and indirectly through lower feelings of powerlessness. These findings suggest that promoting collectivism may be a way to increase engagement with efforts to reduce the spread of COVID‐19. They also highlight the importance of examining the interplay between culture and both personal feelings (powerlessness) and information consumption (conspiracy theories) during times of crisis.

Short video-based prebunking reduces misinformation susceptibility by forewarning viewers about manipulation tactics. However, its effectiveness across older populations (45 + ), diverse cultures, and election-related misinformation remains unclear. To address this, we conducted 13 surveys across 12 EU nations ( N  = 19,735), testing three inoculation videos developed for the largest prebunking campaign to date, which reached 120M+ YouTube users before the 2024 EU Elections. These videos targeted three widely used misinformation tactics—scapegoating, decontextualization, and discrediting—which were prevalent across EU nations leading up to the elections. The videos improved manipulation (measured through manipulativeness assessments) and technique (measured through the correct identification of tactics) discernment of manipulative content from non-manipulative content and enhanced sharing decisions. Though effects were small ( d s ≈ 0.08–0.38), they were significant across surveys. Longer (50 s ) videos showed more consistent improvements in discernment than shorter (20 s ) ones, but both improved technique discernment. Moderation analyses revealed country-level (e.g., education index) and socio-demographic (e.g., personal educational attainment) influences that could inform future interventions. These findings demonstrate that scalable video-based inoculation interventions can be deployed to counter election misinformation across nations, but future work should explore how repeated or context-specific prebunking can sustain resistance to misinformation in diverse electoral and media environments. Across 12 EU nations (N = 19,735), short prebunking videos targeting scapegoating, decontextualization, and discrediting improved older adults’ ability to discern manipulation and make wiser sharing decisions about election misinformation.

Previous research has shown that riots spread across multiple locations, but has not explained underlying psychological processes. We examined rioting in three locations during the August 2011 disorders in England to test a social identity model of riot diffusion. We triangulated multiple sources to construct a narrative of events; and we analysed interviews with 68 participants to examine experiences. In line with the model, we found evidence for two pathways of influence: "cognitive" and "strategic". For some participants, previous rioting was highly self-relevant, and shared identity was the basis of their subsequent involvement. For others, previous rioting was empowering because it demonstrated the vulnerability of a common enemy (the police). In each location, interaction dynamics mediated the link between initial perceptions and collective action. The utility of this social identity approach is that it is able to account for both the boundaries and the sequence of urban riot diffusion.

Collective narcissism – a belief in in‐group greatness that is not appreciated by others – is associated with using one's group for personal benefits. Across one pilot and four studies, we demonstrated that collective narcissism predicts readiness to conspire against in‐group members (r meta‐analysis  = .24). In Study 1, conducted in Poland (N = 361), collective narcissism measured in the context of national identity predicted readiness to engage in secret surveillance against one's own country's citizens. In Study 2 (N = 174; pre‐registered), collective narcissism in UK workplace teams predicted intentions to engage in conspiracies against co‐workers. In Study 3 (N = 471; pre‐registered), US national narcissism predicted intentions to conspire against fellow citizens. Furthermore, conspiracy intentions accounted for the relationship between collective narcissism and beliefs in conspiracy theories about the in‐group. Finally, in Study 4 (N = 1064; pre‐registered), we corroborated the link between Polish national narcissism and conspiracy intentions against fellow citizens, further showing that these intentions were only directed towards group members that were perceived as moderately or strongly typical of the national in‐group (but not when perceived in‐group typicality was low). In‐group identification was either negatively related (Studies 1 and 2) or unrelated (Studies 3 and 4) to conspiracy intentions (r meta‐analysis  = .04). We discuss implications for research on conspiracy theories and populism.

Psychological inoculation has proven effective at reducing susceptibility to misinformation. We present a novel storytelling approach to inoculation against susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy (d(meta-analysis) = 0.82), a known cognitive predictor of conspiracy beliefs. In Study 1 (Pilot; N = 161), a narrative inoculation (vs. control) reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and in turn, conspiracy beliefs regarding government malfeasance. In Study 2 (main experiment; N = 141; pre-registered), two separate narrative inoculations (vs. control) directly reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and indirectly reduced conspiracy beliefs regarding extra-terrestrial cover-ups. In addition, the inoculation messages improved detection of both real and fake news ('truth discernment'). We discuss theoretical and practical implications, including the use of inoculation to induce critical thinking styles, and tailoring inoculations that may suit storytelling mediums.

Collective narcissism, a belief that one's group is exceptional and entitled to special treatment but underappreciated by others, is related to important social and political outcomes but has been predominantly studied in advantaged groups. The present research compares the motivational correlates (through values) of collective narcissism in ethnic groups of different status (advantaged and disadvantaged) and explores its associations with attitudes towards, and intention to engage in collective action. Three studies examined these processes in different national and intergroup contexts (total N = 16,275). Overall, ethnic collective narcissism was linked to self‐protective values (power, and less consistently, conservation) in advantaged groups but to universalism in disadvantaged groups. Moreover, in both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, ethnic collective narcissism was related to more positive attitudes towards, and intentions of pro‐ingroup actions but not to attitudes towards (other) disadvantaged groups (i.e., intergroup solidarity). These studies suggest that collective narcissism may be associated with different motivations, yet linked to similar intergroup attitudes among advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

Building misinformation resilience at scale continues to pose a challenge. Gamified "inoculation" interventions have shown promise in improving people's ability to recognize manipulation techniques commonly used in misinformation, but so far few interventions exist that tackle multimodal misinformation (e.g., videos, images). We developed a game called Cat Park, in which players learn about five manipulation techniques (trolling, emotional manipulation, amplification, polarization, and conspiracism), and how misinformation can spread through images. To test the game's efficacy, we conducted a conceptual replication (N = 380) of Roozenbeek and van der Linden's 2020 study about Harmony Square, with the same study design, item set, and hypotheses. Like the original study, we find that people who play Cat Park find misinformation significantly less reliable post-gameplay (d = 0.95, p < 0.001) compared to a control group, and are significantly less willing to share misinformation with people in their network (d = 0.54, p < 0.001). These effects are robust across different covariates. However, unlike the original study, Cat Park players do not become significantly more confident in their ability to identify misinformation (p = 0.204, d = - 0.13). We did not find that the game increases people's self-reported motivation and confidence to counter misinformation online.

Meta-analyses have demonstrated how inoculation interventions increase the detection of misinformation, but their scalability has remained elusive. To address this, Study 1 (pre-registered; N = 1,583) tested the efficacy of three short inoculation videos (prebunks) against three common manipulation tactics used in misinformation: (1) polarization, (2) conspiracy theories, and (3) fake experts. Results indicated that all three inoculation videos (vs. control) increased the detection of relevant manipulative content without altering perceptions of non-manipulative content, but only the polarization inoculation video increased manipulation discernment (i.e., increased ability to distinguish between manipulative and non-manipulative content). In Study 2 (pre-registered; N = 1,603), we tested the efficacy of three more inoculation videos containing logic-based prebunks against logical fallacies commonly used in misinformation: (1) whataboutism, (2) the moving the goalposts fallacy, and (3) the strawman fallacy. Detection of the relevant fallacious content was higher in all conditions (vs. control), but only the strawman fallacy inoculation video increased fallacy discernment. The moving the goalposts fallacy inoculation video appeared to increase overall distrust of relevant content, whereas the other two videos did not alter perceptions of relevant non-fallacious content. We discuss the implications and limitations of these findings.

Conspiracy theories abound in social and political discourse, believed by millions of people around the world. In this article, we highlight when it is important to engage with people who believe in conspiracy theories and review recent literature highlighting how best to do so. We first summarise research on the potentially damaging consequences of conspiracy beliefs for individuals, including consequences related to psychopathology. We also focus on the consequences for groups, and societies, and the importance of understanding and addressing conspiracy beliefs. We then review recent literature on how to engage with people who believe in conspiracy theories, specifically with the goal to reduce susceptibility to conspiracy theories and other types of misinformation. We focus on interpersonal strategies to communicate with individuals who believe in conspiracy theories, and large-scale strategies designed to reduce conspiracy beliefs within broader communities.

Prior research suggests that people who believe in and spread conspiracy theories are often viewed negatively, yet investigations systematically disentangling both factors are scarce. The present research addressed this gap through two pre-registered experiments with representative samples from the United States. In Study 1, 418 participants evaluated eight fictional individuals across 3,344 trials, presented as (a) believing in and/or (b) spreading conspiracy theories in a 2 x 2 within-subjects design. Analyses revealed that both characters who believed in conspiracy theories and those who spread them were perceived as less competent, moral, and warm, and as more narcissistic, Machiavellian, and psychopathic. Moreover, both believers and spreaders were perceived as likely to engage in conspiratorial actions themselves, and participants reported lower willingness to interact with them. However, significant interactions for all variables showed that these effects were particularly pronounced for characters who spread conspiracy theories without believing in them. Notably, participants' own conspiracy beliefs and, to some extent, their right-wing political orientation attenuated several effects and reversed some. In Study 2, we employed the reverse-correlation technique to model 412 participants' mental representations of individuals who varied in belief and/or spread of conspiracy theories using a 2 x 2 between-subjects design. Results were directionally consistent with Study 1-both believers and spreaders of conspiracy theories were mentally represented less favorably-but no interactions or moderations were observed. Moreover, believing had significantly stronger effects than spreading on the rating dimensions. We discuss the social implications of these results and outline future directions.