Dr Steve Wesemeyer

Senior Teaching Fellow, Secure Systems
BSc, PhD

Academic and research departments

Department of Computer Science.



Rhys Miller, Ioana Boureanu, Stephan Wesemeyer, Christopher J. P. Newton (2022)The 5G Key-Establishment Stack: In-Depth Formal Verification and Experimentation, In: ASIA CCS'22: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2022 ACM ASIA CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITYpp. 237-251 Assoc Computing Machinery

We formally analyse the security of each 5G authenticated key-establisment (AKE) procedures: the 5G registration, the 5G authentication and key agreement (AKA) and 5G handovers. We also study the security of their composition, which we call the 5GAKE_stack. Our security analysis focuses on aspects of multi-party AKEs that occur in the 5GAKE_stack. We also look at the consequences this AKE (in)security has over critical mobile-networks' objects such as the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) sessions, which are used to bill subscribers and ensure quality of service as per their contracts/plans. In our assessments, we augment the standard Dolev-Yao model with different levels of trust and threat by considering honest, honest-but-curious, as well as completely rogue radio nodes. We formally prove security in the first case, and insecurity in the latter two as well as making formal recommendations on this. We carry out our formal analysis using the Tamarin-Prover. Lastly, we also present an emulator of the 5GAKE_stack. This can be a useful "5G API"-like tool for the community to experiment with the 5GAKE_stack, since the 5G networks are not yet fully deployed and mobile networks are proprietary and closed "loops".

Chris Culnane, Ioana Boureanu, Jean Snyman, Stephan Wesemeyer, Helen Treharne (2023)Formalising Application-Driven Authentication & Access-Control based on Users’ Companion Devices, In: ASIA CCS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security ACM

We define and formalise a generic cryptographic construction that underpins coupling of companion devices, e.g., biometrics-enabled devices, with main devices(e.g., PCs), in a user-aware manner, mainly for on-demand authentication and secure storage for applications running on the main device. We define the security requirements of such constructions, provide a full instantiation in a protocol-suite and prove its computational as well as Dolev-Yao security. Finally, we implement our protocol suite and one password-manager use-case

Rhys Miller, Ioana Boureanu, Stephan Wesemeyer, Christopher J. P. Newton (2022)The 5G Key-Establishment Stack: In-Depth Formal Verification and Experimentation
R. Miller, Ioana Cristina Boureanu, Wesemeyer, S, Zhili Sun, Hemant Zope (2023)Systematic Improvement of Access-Stratum Security in Mobile Networks

In mobile networks, the User Equipment (UE) secures some of the communication with its serving Radio Access Network (RAN) node ("base station") via a set of keys known as Access Stratum (AS) keys. Unfortunately, the level of secrecy of these keys varies with the mobile procedures re-establishing them. To improve the secrecy of the AS keys, we propose minimal changes to 5G & 4G handovers, i.e., the main AS-key establishment procedures. We show the minimality of our changes also via an implementation of one of our protocol in the 3GPP-compliant Open5GCore 5G testbed. We also cross-compare standard handovers with our amended handovers, systematically via MobTrustCom: a framework to quantify especially trust but also communication complexity in mobile networks. Moreover, we use Tamarin, a formal security-protocol verification tool, to prove no loss of "classical" security yet an increase in AS-keys' secrecy brought by our improvements to handovers.

Jay Le-Papin, Brijesh Dongol, Helen Treharne, Stephan Wesemeyer (2023)Verifying List Swarm Attestation Protocols

Swarm attestation protocols extend remote attestation by allowing a verifier to efficiently measure the integrity of software code running on a collection of heterogeneous devices across a network. Many swarm attestation protocols have been proposed for a variety of system configurations. However, these protocols are currently missing explicit specifications of the properties guaranteed by the protocol and formal proofs of correctness. In this paper, we address this gap in the context of list swarm attestation protocols, a category of swarm attestation protocols that allow a verifier to identify the set of healthy provers in a swarm. We describe the security requirements of swarm attestation protocols. We focus our work on the SIMPLE+ protocol, which we model and verify using the tamarin prover. Our proofs enable us to identify two variations of SIMPLE+: (1) we remove one of the keys used by SIMPLE+ without compromising security, and (2) we develop a more robust design that increases the resilience of the swarm to device compromise. Using tamarin, we demonstrate that both modifications preserve the desired security properties.

AS Alfraih, JA Briffa, S Wesemeyer (2015)Cloning localization approach using k-means clustering and support vector machine, In: JOURNAL OF ELECTRONIC IMAGING24(4)ARTN 04301 IS&T & SPIE
S Wesemeyer (1998)On the automorphism group of various Goppa codes, In: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY44(2)pp. 630-643 IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
Jinguang Han, Liqun Chen, Steve Schneider, Helen Treharne, Steve Wesemeyer (2019)Privacy-Preserving Electronic Ticket Scheme with Attribute-Based Credentials, In: IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computingpp. 1-1 IEEE

Users accessing services are often required to provide personal information, for example, age, profession and location, in order to satisfy access polices. This personal information is evident in the application of e-ticketing where discounted access is granted to visitor attractions or transport services if users satisfy policies related to their age or disability or other defined over attributes. We propose a privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme using attribute-based credentials to protect users’ privacy. The benefit of our scheme is that the attributes of a user are certified by a trusted third party so that the scheme can provide assurances to a seller that a user’s attributes are valid. The scheme makes the following contributions: (1) users can buy different tickets from ticket sellers without releasing their exact attributes; (2) two tickets of the same user cannot be linked; (3) a ticket cannot be transferred to another user; (4) a ticket cannot be double spent. The novelty of our scheme is to enable users to convince ticket sellers that their attributes satisfy the ticket policies and buy discounted tickets anonymously. This is a step towards identifying an e-ticketing scheme that captures user privacy requirements in transport services. The security of our scheme is proved and reduced to a well-known complexity assumption. The scheme is also implemented and its performance is empirically evaluated.

Jinguang Han, Liqun Chen, Steve Schneider, Helen Treharne, Stephan Wesemeyer, Nick Wilson (2020)Anonymous Single Sign-On With Proxy Re-Verification, In: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security15(1)pp. 223-236 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

An anonymous single sign-on (ASSO) scheme allows users to access multiple services anonymously using one credential. We propose a new ASSO scheme, where users can access services anonymously through the use of anonymous credentials and unlinkably through the provision of designated verifiers. Notably, verifiers cannot link a user’s service requests even if they collude. The novelty is that when a designated verifier is unavailable, a central authority can authorize new verifiers to authenticate the user on behalf of the original verifier. Furthermore, a central verifier can also be authorized to de-anonymize users and trace their service requests. We formalize the scheme along with a security proof and provide an empirical evaluation of its performance. This scheme can be applied to smart ticketing where minimizing the collection of personal information of users is increasingly important to transport organizations due to privacy regulations such as general data protection regulations (GDPRs).

Jorden Whitefield, Liqun Chen, F Kargl, A Paverd, Steven Schneider, Helen Treharne, Stephan Wesemeyer (2017)Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation Protocols., In: Proceedings of STM’17. Lecture Notes in Computer Science10547pp. 147-163 Springer

Research on vehicular networking (V2X) security has produced a range of security mechanisms and protocols tailored for this domain, addressing both security and privacy. Typically, the security analysis of these proposals has largely been informal. However, formal analysis can be used to expose flaws and ultimately provide a higher level of assurance in the protocols. This paper focusses on the formal analysis of a particular element of security mechanisms for V2X found in many proposals, that is the revocation of malicious or misbehaving vehicles from the V2X system by invalidating their credentials. This revocation needs to be performed in an unlinkable way for vehicle privacy even in the context of vehicles regularly changing their pseudonyms. The Rewire scheme by Förster et al. and its subschemes Plain and R-token aim to solve this challenge by means of cryptographic solutions and trusted hardware. Formal analysis using the Tamarin prover identifies two flaws: one previously reported in the literature concerned with functional correctness of the protocol, and one previously unknown flaw concerning an authentication property of the R-token scheme. In response to these flaws we propose Obscure Token (O-token), an extension of Rewire to enable revocation in a privacy preserving manner. Our approach addresses the functional and authentication properties by introducing an additional key-pair, which offers a stronger and verifiable guarantee of successful revocation of vehicles without resolving the long-term identity. Moreover O-token is the first V2X revocation protocol to be co-designed with a formal model.

S Wesemeyer, P Sweeney (1998)Suboptimal soft-decision decoding for some RS-codes, In: ELECTRONICS LETTERS34(10)pp. 983-984 IEE-INST ELEC ENG
P Sweeney, S Wesemeyer (2000)Iterative soft-decision decoding of linear block codes, In: IEE PROCEEDINGS-COMMUNICATIONS147(3)pp. 133-136 IEE-INST ELEC ENG
Jinguang Han, Liqun Chen, Steve Schneider, Helen Treharne, Stephan Wesemeyer (2018)Anonymous Single-Sign-On for n designated services with traceability, In: Javier Lopez, Jianying Zhou, Miguel Soriano (eds.), Computer Security: 23rd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2018, Barcelona, Spain, September 3-7, 2018, Proceedings, Part I (Lecture Notes in Computer Science Book 11098)11098 Springer

Anonymous Single-Sign-On authentication schemes have been proposed to allow users to access a service protected by a verifier without revealing their identity. This has become more important with the introduction of strong privacy regulations. In this paper we describe a new approach whereby anonymous authentication to different verifiers is achieved via authorisation tags and pseudonyms. The particular innovation of our scheme is that authentication can occur only between a user and its designated verifier for a service, and the verification cannot be performed by any other verifier. The benefit of this authentication approach is that it prevents information leakage of a user's service access information, even if the verifiers for these services collude. Our scheme also supports a trusted third party who is authorised to de-anonymise the user and reveal her whole service access information if required. Furthermore, our scheme is lightweight because it does not rely on attribute or policy-based signature schemes to enable access to multiple services. The scheme's security model is given together with a security proof, an implementation and a performance evaluation.

Jorden Whitefield, Liqun Chen, Ralf Sasse, Steve Schneider, Helen Treharne, Stephan Wesemeyer (2019)A Symbolic Analysis of ECC-based Direct Anonymous Attestation, In: Proceedings of the 4th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a cryptographic scheme that provides Trusted Platform Module (TPM)- backed anonymous credentials. We develop TAMARIN modelling of the ECC-based version of the protocol as it is standardised and provide the first mechanised analysis of this standard. Our analysis confirms that the scheme is secure when all TPMs are assumed honest, but reveals a break in the protocol’s expected authentication and secrecy properties for all TPMs even if only one is compromised. We propose and formally verify a minimal fix to the standard. In addition to developing the first formal analysis of ECC-DAA, the paper contributes to the growing body of work demonstrating the use of formal tools in supporting standardisation processes for cryptographic protocols.

Stephan Wesemeyer, Ioana Boureanu, Zach Smith, Helen Treharne (2020)Extensive Security Verification of the LoRaWAN Key-Establishment: Insecurities & Patches, In: 2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)pp. 425-444 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

LoRaWAN (Low-power Wide-Area Networks) is the main specification for application-level IoT (Internet of Things). The current version, published in October 2017, is LoRaWAN 1.1, with its 1.0 precursor still being the main specification supported by commercial devices such as PyCom LoRa transceivers. Prior (semi)-formal investigations into the security of the LoRaWAN protocols are scarce, especially for Lo-RaWAN 1.1. Moreover, amongst these few, the current encodings [4], [9] of LoRaWAN into verification tools unfortunately rely on much-simplified versions of the LoRaWAN protocols, undermining the relevance of the results in practice. In this paper, we fill in some of these gaps. Whilst we briefly discuss the most recent cryptographic-orientated works [5] that looked at LoRaWAN 1.1, our true focus is on producing formal analyses of the security and correctness of LoRaWAN, mechanised inside automated tools. To this end, we use the state-of-the-art prover, Tamarin. Importantly, our Tamarin models are a faithful and precise rendering of the LoRaWAN specifications. For example, we model the bespoke nonce-generation mechanisms newly introduced in LoRaWAN 1.1, as well as the "classical" but shortdomain nonces in LoRaWAN 1.0 and make recommendations regarding these. Whilst we include small parts on device-commissioning and application-level traffic, we primarily scrutinise the Join Procedure of LoRaWAN, and focus on version 1.1 of the specification, but also include an analysis of Lo-RaWAN 1.0. To this end, we consider three increasingly strong threat models, resting on a Dolev-Yao attacker acting modulo different requirements made on various channels (e.g., secure/insecure) and the level of trust placed on entities (e.g., honest/corruptible network servers). Importantly, one of these threat models is exactly in line with the LoRaWAN specification, yet it unfortunately still leads to attacks. In response to the exhibited attacks, we propose a minimal patch of the LoRaWAN 1.1 Join Procedure, which is as backwards-compatible as possible with the current version. We analyse and prove this patch secure in the strongest threat model mentioned above. This work has been responsibly disclosed to the LoRa Alliance, and we are liaising with the Security Working Group of the LoRa Alliance, in order to improve the clarity of the LoRaWAN 1.1 specifications in light of our findings, but also by using formal analysis as part of a feedback-loop of future and current specification writing.

Steve Wesemeyer, Christopher Newton, Helen Treharne, Liqun Chen, Ralf Sasse, Jordan Whitefield (2020)Formal Analysis and Implementation of a TPM 2.0-based Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme, In: 15th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Direct Anonymous Attestation (Daa) is a set of cryptographic schemes used to create anonymous digital signatures. To provide additional assurance, Daa schemes can utilise a Trusted Platform Module (Tpm) that is a tamper-resistant hardware device embedded in a computing platform and which provides cryptographic primitives and secure storage. We extend Chen and Li’s Daa scheme to support: 1) signing a message anonymously, 2) self-certifying Tpm keys, and 3) ascertaining a platform’s state as recorded by the Tpm’s platform configuration registers (PCR) for remote attestation, with explicit reference to Tpm 2.0 API calls.We perform a formal analysis of the scheme and are the first symbolic models to explicitly include the low-level Tpm call details. Our analysis reveals that a fix proposed by Whitefield et al. to address an authentication attack on an Ecc-Daa scheme is also required by our scheme. Developing a finegrained, formal model of a Daa scheme contributes to the growing body of work demonstrating the use of formal tools in supporting security analyses of cryptographic protocols. We additionally provide and benchmark an open-source C++ implementation of this Daa scheme supporting both a hardware and a software Tpm and measure its performance.

Ksenia Budykho, Ioana Cristina Boureanu, Stephan Wesemeyer, Daniel Romero, Matt Lewis, Yogaratnam Rahulan, Fortunat Rajaona (2023)Fine-Grained Trackability in Protocol Executions, In: Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2023

We introduce a new framework, TrackDev, for encoding and analysing the tracing or "tracking" of an entity (e.g., a device) via its executions of a protocol or its usages of a system. TrackDev considers multiple dimensions combined: whether the attacker is active or passive, whether an entity is trackable in its every single appearances or just in a compound set thereof, and whether the entity can be explicitly or implicitly identified. TrackDev can be applied to most identification-based systems. TrackDev is to be applied in practice, over actual executions of systems; to this end, we test TrackDev on real-life traffic for two well-known protocols, the LoRaWAN Join and the 5G handovers, showing new trackability attacks therein and proposing countermeasures. We study the strength of TrackDev's various trackability properties and show that many of our notions are incomparable amongst each other, thus justifying the fine-grained nature of TrackDev. Finally, we detail how the main thrust of TrackDev can be mechanised in formal-verification tools, without any loss; we exemplify this fully on the LoRaWAN Join, in the Tamarin prover. In this process, we also uncover and discuss within two important aspects: (a) TrackDev’s separation between "explicit" and "implicit" trackability offers new formal-verification insights; (b) our analyses of the LoRaWAN Join protocol in Tamarin against TrackDev as well as against existing approximations of unlinkability by Baelde et al. concretely show that the latter approximations can be coarser than our notions.

AA Alshehri, JA Briffa, SA Schneider, S Wesemeyer (2013)Formal Security Analysis of NFC M-coupon Protocols using Casper/FDR

Near field communication (NFC) is a standard-based, radio frequency (RF), wireless communication technology that allows data to be exchanged between devices that are less than 20 cm apart. NFC security protocols require formal security analysis before massive adoptions, in order to check whether these protocols meet its requirements and goals. In this paper we formally analyse NFC-based mobile coupon protocols using formal methods (Casper/FDR). We find an attack against the advanced protocol, and then we provide a solution that addresses the vulnerability formally.

JA Briffa, HG Schaathun, S Wesemeyer (2010)An Improved Decoding Algorithm for the Davey-MacKay Construction, In: Proc. IEEE Intern. Conf. on Commun.pp. 1-5

The Deletion-Insertion Correcting Code construction proposed by Davey and MacKay consists of an inner code that recovers synchronization and an outer code that provides substitution error protection. The inner code uses low-weight codewords which are added (modulo two) to a pilot sequence. The receiver is able to synchronise on the pilot sequence in spite of the changes introduced by the added codeword. The original bit-level formulation of the inner decoder assumes that all bits in the sparse codebook are identically and independently distributed. Not only is this assumption inaccurate, but it also prevents the use of soft a- priori input to the decoder. We propose an alternative symbol-level inner decoding algorithm that takes the actual codebook into account. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm has an improved performance with only a small penalty in complexity, and it allows other improvements using inner codes with larger minimum distance.

AS Alfraih, JA Briffa, S Wesemeyer (2015)Cloning Localization Based on Feature Extraction and K-means Clustering, In: YQ Shi, HJ Kim, F PerezGonzalez, CN Yang (eds.), DIGITAL-FORENSICS AND WATERMARKING, IWDW 20149023pp. 410-419
S Wesemeyer, P Sweeney, DRB Burgess (1999)Some soft-decision decoding algorithms for Reed-Solomon codes, In: M Walker (eds.), CRYPTOGRAPHY AND CODING1746pp. 290-299
TP Diakos, JA Briffa, TWC Brown, S Wesemeyer (2013)Eavesdropping Near Field Contactless Payments: A Quantitative Analysis, In: IET Journal of Engineering
AA Alfraih, JA Briffa, S Wesemeyer (2014)Forgery Localization Based on Image Chroma Feature Extraction, In: Intern. Conf. on Imaging for Crime Detection and Prevention (ICDP)