Nickolaos Travlos

Nickolaos Travlos


Professor of Finance and Accounting
PhD, MPhil, MBA, BSc
Tuesdays 12:00-13:30; Wednesdays 12:00-13:30 by appointment

Biography

Biography

Professor Nickolaos Travlos joined the University of Surrey in September 2016 as Professor of Finance and Accounting. He has teaching and research interests in the areas of Corporate Finance, Financial Analysis, Financial Markets, Banking, and Mergers and Acquisitions. Prior to the University of Surrey he was at ALBA Graduate Business School (1992-2016) holding the Kitty Kyriacopoulos Chair in Finance and serving as its first Dean (1998-2016).

He has also taught at Boston College, City University of New York (Baruch College), New York University (L. Stern School of Business) and University of Piraeus (1990-1998), where he served as Chairman of the Department of Banking and Financial Management (1993-1997) and Director (founder) of the MSc in Banking and Financial Management (1997-1998). Moreover, he held the position of Distinguished Senior Research Fellow at Cardiff Business School (U.K.), 1998-2007.

Professor Travlos' research has been published in leading academic journals such as The Journal of Finance (10 papers); Journal of Accounting Research; Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; Journal of Corporate Finance; Review of Finance; Financial Management; Journal of Financial Research, etc. His research findings have been cited widely in numerous international academic journals and text-books, while managerial implications of his work have appeared in the best relevant outlets. In 2008 Professor Travlos was recognized as one of the “most contributing” authors in the Journal of Finance (JF), “the gold standard in academic finance literature”, over its six decades of existence. In addition, his published article “Corporate Takeovers Bids, Methods of Payment and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns” (The Journal of Finance, 1987b) was included in 1994 in the list of the twenty most influential published papers in Finance. Other published papers have been voted as the best papers appeared in the associated journals. He has served on the editorial Board of several international academic journals and has served as President/Chairman of several international academic Associations and Conferences. His research agenda includes Mergers and Acquisitions, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, Corporate Control, Dividend Policy, Ownership Structure, International Acquisitions, Leveraged Buyouts, Capital Restructuring and Raising New Capital.

He is a finance consultant and has served on the Board of Directors of several national and international firms. He was a member of the Board of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission from 2004 until 2009 and of the Hellenic Competition Commission from 2009 to 2012. He served as Chairman of the Board of the Athens International Airport (2013-2015) and vice-chairman of the Board of International Transparency - Hellas (2013-2016).

Teaching

Currently teaching Financial Management at the MBA Programme.

My publications

Publications

Petmezas D, Dahya J, Golubov A, Travlos NG (2016) Governance Mandates, Outside Directors and Acquirer Performance, Journal of Corporate Finance
We use hand-collected board data around the issuance of two distinct government-led board structure mandates in the U.K. to establish the effect of outside directors on acquirer performance. Increases in outside director representation are associated with better acquirer returns in deals involving listed targets, but not when the target is private. These results are consistent with greater outside director reputational exposure when publicity is high. While we do not advocate mandated board structures, our evidence suggests that the particular diktats we examine were associated with improved acquirer performance in public firm takeovers. We present corroborating evidence from the U.S. around a similar reform period.
Karampatsas N, Petmezas D, Travlos N (2014) Credit ratings and the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions, JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 25 pp. 474-493 ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Petmezas D, Golubov A, Travlos N (2015) Do Stock-Financed Acquisitions Destroy Value? New Methods and Evidence, Review of Finance Oxford Journals
We contribute to the debate on whether stock-financed acquisitions destroy value for shareholders. A stock-financed acquisition is a joint takeover/equity-issue event. Using seasoned equity offering announcement returns, we estimate through linear prediction and propensity-score matching the share price drop that stock acquirers experience due to the financing choice. Net of this effect, stock-financed acquisitions are not value destructive, and the method of payment generally has no further explanatory power in the cross-section of acquirer returns. Our evidence is largely inconsistent with the agency costs of overvalued equity hypothesis.
Alexandridis G, Antypas N, Travlos Nikolaos (2017) Value Creation from M&As: New Evidence, Journal of Corporate Finance 45 pp. 632-650 Elsevier
M&A deals create more value for acquiring firm shareholders post-2009 than ever before. Public acquisitions fuel positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for acquirers while stock-for-stock deals no longer destroy value. Mega deals, priced at least $500mil, typically associated with more pronounced agency problems, investor scrutiny and media attention, seem to be driving the documented upturn. Acquiring shareholders now gain $62 mil around the announcement of such deals; a $325 mil gain improvement compared to 1990-2009. The corresponding synergistic gains have also catapulted to more than $542 mil pointing to overall value creation from M&As on a large scale. Our results are robust to different measures and controls and appear to be linked with profound improvements in the quality of corporate governance among acquiring firms in the aftermath of the 2009 financial crisis.
Papadopoulos Panagiotis (2019) Essays in bank lending.,
The banking industry plays a critical role in the modern economic world, with lending being one of the most important services rendered by banks and having vital implications for social and economic welfare. Specifically, mortgage lending is crucial in shaping households' living standards while corporate lending has a decisive role in enhancing real economic activity and promoting a country?s economic growth. This Thesis consists of three chapters which study three separate topics in the area of bank lending (mortgage loans and corporate loans).
In Chapter 1, entitled "Lending discrimination across the U.S.: New methodology and the role of the subprime crisis", we examine whether discrimination in mortgage-loan origination and pricing exists, and if so, whether the level of discrimination differ before and after the eruption of the subprime crisis. Using data from 6.5 million loan applications from 2004 through 2013, we propose a novel approach aiming to substantially lower the notorious omitted-variable bias of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database and identify the level of racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination in mortgage lending across the United States. In stark contrast with previous studies, we find, on average, very little discrimination in loan origination. Although discrimination increases somewhat after 2007, its probability remains well below 1%. In contrast, we find that white (non-Hispanic) applicants pay a lower spread on the originated loans by 0.37 (0.11) basis points, a result that almost entirely comes from the pre-crisis period.
A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme (DIS), which can be either privately or government-funded. In Chapter 2, entitled "Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending", we study the effect of government involvement in explicit DIS funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries over 1985-2016, we show that changes in DIS from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly-funded increase all-in-drawn spreads by approximately 4.6%, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded explicit DIS.
In Chapter 3, entitled "Creditor rights and corporate lending revisited", we challenge the conventional finding that stronger legal protection of creditors improves the terms of corporate loan deals. Using global syndicated loan data from 1986 to 2005, we revisit the effect of creditor rights on corporate loan terms (spread, amount, and maturity). Instead of focusing only on cross-country differences, we also investigate within-country variation in creditor rights index by using country fixed effects and event-study methodologies. In stark contrast with previous findings, we find that the level of creditors? protection does not significantly affect banks? decisions on corporate loan terms. Our findings highlight that strengthening creditors? protection is not necessarily an appropriate mechanism for promoting more competitive lending terms.

Additional publications