Dr Zicheng Lei

Debt-financed share buybacks generate positive short-term and long-run abnormal stock returns. Leveraged buyback firms have more debt capacity, higher marginal tax rate, lower excess cash and lower growth prospects ex ante, increase leverage and reduce investments more sharply ex post than cash-financed buyback firms. Firms that are over-levered ex-ante are associated with lower returns and real investments following leveraged buybacks. The lower announcement returns of over-levered firms are concentrated on firms with weaker corporate governance. The evidence is consistent with leveraged buybacks enabling firms to optimize their leverage, on average benefiting shareholders. The benefits decrease with a firm's leverage ex ante.

This paper analyzes the effect that the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision on Citizens United vs. FEC had on corporate political activism. The decision opened the door for corporate treasuries to engage in independent political spending. Politically connected firms have lower announcement returns at the ruling than non-connected firms. The estimates suggest that the value of a political connection decreases by $6.9 million. To evaluate the effect of Citizens United on corporate political activism, we explore the fact that Citizens United also lifts bans on independent political spending in states where such bans existed. After the ruling, firms headquartered in states where bans are lifted have fewer state-level connections relative to firms in other states. Overall, our evidence supports the hypothesis that independent political spending crowds out political connections. We do not find any significant crowding-out effects of independent political expenditures on lobbying activity, executive contributions, and political action committees (PAC) contributions.