Dr Zicheng Lei

Using Internet search volume of dividend-related keywords as a direct measure of investor preference for dividends (i.e., dividend sentiment), we show that dividend sentiment is high when economic conditions are poor. Mutual funds that pay high dividends receive more inflows when dividend sentiment is stronger. Further, firms initiate or increase dividends when dividend sentiment is stronger, especially in regions with strong dividend sentiment. We find similar results for share repurchases. Shifts in dividend sentiment predict higher demand for dividends and higher returns for high dividend stocks. Collectively, these results suggest that dividend sentiment affects corporate policies and asset prices. 

This paper analyzes agency conflicts between U.S. public pension funds and other shareholders. It studies the landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. FEC, which opens new doors for political activism by the business. At the ruling, politically connected firms held by public pension funds have lower announcement returns. After the ruling, these firms remain engaged in political connections and experience a relative increase in ownership by public pension funds. Our evidence is consistent with public pension funds having a preference for more traditional forms of political activism, a preference not shared by other investors.