Dr Alex Leveringhaus

Over the last decade or so, interest in Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) has grown among academics, policy makers, and campaigners. The debate, however, has been dominated by international lawyers, ethicists, and technologists at the expense of other analytical lenses. This chapter uses International Relations Theory (IRT) in order to provide a fresh perspective, focussing on realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches. Beginning with a conceptual discussion of the nature of LAWS, the chapter uses IRT to assess the potential impact of LAWS on the ability and willingness of states to cooperate under conditions of anarchy. The chapter concludes that while established IRTs offer useful insights into the impact of LAWS on wider international security, LAWS also push the conceptual boundaries of IRT. Over time, IRT might have to adapt itself to deal with the practical consequences of the introduction of LAWS.

In this chapter, political philosopher Alex Leveringhaus asks whether Lethal Autonomous Weapons (AWS) are morally repugnant and whether this entails that they should be prohibited by international law. To this end, Leveringhaus critically surveys three prominent ethical arguments against AWS: firstly, AWS create ‘responsibility gaps’; secondly, that their use is incompatible with human dignity; and ,thirdly, that AWS replace human agency with artificial agency. He argues that some of these arguments fail to show that AWS are morally different from more established weapons. However, the author concludes that AWS are currently problematic due to their lack of predictability.

This paper critically examines the implications of technology for the ethics of intervention and vice versa, especially regarding (but not limited to) the concept of military humanitarian intervention (MHI). To do so, it uses two recent pro-interventionist proposals as lenses through which to analyse the relationship between interventionism and technology. These are A. Altman and C.H. Wellman’s argument for the assassination of tyrannical leaders, and C. Fabre’s case for foreign electoral subversion. Existing and emerging technologies, the paper contends, play an important role in realising these proposals. This illustrates the potential of technology to facilitate interventionist practices that transcend the traditional concept of MHI, with its reliance on kinetic force and large-scale military operations. The question, of course, is whether this is normatively desirable. Here, the paper takes a critical view. While there is no knockdown argument against either assassination or electoral subversion for humanitarian purposes, both approaches face similar challenges, most notably regarding public accountability, effectiveness, and appropriate regulatory frameworks. The paper concludes by making alternative suggestions for how technology can be utilised to improve the protection of human rights. Overall, the paper shows that an engagement with technology is fruitful and necessary for the ethics of intervention.