Hyungseok Joo

Dr Hyungseok Joo


Lecturer in Economics

Academic and research departments

Faculty of Arts, Business and Social Sciences, Economics.

About

Research

Research interests

Teaching

Publications

Moonhee Cho, Hyungseok Joo (2024)Sovereign default and FDI transactions: Evidence from Argentina, In: Economics Letters243111940 Elsevier

This paper investigates the effect of sovereign debt default on foreign direct investment (FDI) transactions by US firms into Argentina following the Argentine sovereign default in 2019–20. Using the synthetic control approach, we find that the number of FDI transactions decreased by approximately 60% after the Argentine default with a particularly pronounced decline in the non-manufacturing sector. By examining the changes in the number of transactions, we provide a more precise picture of the cost of sovereign default, capturing the FDI activity of small firms better.

Tamon Asonuma, Hyungseok Joo (2020)Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Delays in Renegotiation and Risk Averse Creditors, In: Journal of the European Economic Association Oxford University Press

Foreign creditors’ business cycles influence both the process and the outcome of sovereign debt restructurings. We compile two datasets on creditor committees and chairs and on creditor business and financial cycles at the restructurings, and find that when creditors experience high GDP growth, restructurings are delayed and settled with smaller haircuts. To rationalize these stylized facts, we develop a theoretical model of sovereign debt with multi-round renegotiations between a risk averse sovereign debtor and a risk averse creditor. The quantitative analysis of the model shows that high creditor income results in both longer delays in renegotiations and smaller haircuts. Our theoretical predictions are supported by data. (JEL: F34, F41, H63)

Hyungseok Joo, Yoon-Jin Lee, Young-Ro Yoon (2023)Effects of information quality on signaling through sovereign debt issuance, In: Journal of economic behavior & organization207pp. 279-304 Elsevier B.V

This paper develops a sovereign debt model proposing that a debt issuance can be a credible signaling channel between a sovereign government and foreign creditors. The government has private information regarding the future economy. The one with a good economic outlook would like to find a credible way to disclose it to obtain a high bond price. Foreign creditors are interested in inferring the government’s private information to assess sovereign default risk precisely. The government’s private information is imperfect, so the precision of information matters. We study how the interaction of the prior, the signal, and its precision affects the equilibrium and the resulting welfare. We propose a unique separating signaling equilibrium demonstrating the feature that a more precise signal of good economic outlook leads to a greater extent of fiscal austerity. As the information becomes more precise, the signaling cost for a government with a good economic outlook increases. Interestingly, unless the prior is very pessimistic, a highly precise signal harms the sovereign because a resulting strong signaling motive drives it to reduce bond issuance excessively (paradox of highly precise information).