Nada El Kassem is a current PhD researcher at the University of Surrey. She started her PhD study at the Department of Computer Science in April 2016. Her PhD is supervised by Prof. Liqun Chen and Prof. Steve Schneider. Her current research focuses on designing lattice based anonymous signatures, mainly she is working on designing a practical quantum resistant lattice based Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA).
Nada completed her BSc in Mathematics with high distinction at Lebanese International University, Lebanon 2006. After that, she completed her MSc degree (with honours) in Mathematics at Beirut Arab University, Lebanon 2008. Her previous research work focused on solving the Inverse Eigenvalue Problem, and was supervised by Prof. Bassam Mourad.
Nada’s current research interests include anonymous authentication, quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions, hardware security, and she is also interested in fully homomorphic encryption.
Nada led tutorial and lab sessions for the course Com1026: Foundations of Computing (October 2016 -January 2017), Department of Computer Science, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK.
She also worked as a University lecturer at the Lebanese International University, Lebanon. She taught the following courses: Linear Algebra, Calculus, Business Mathematics, Differential Equations and Engineering Mathematics, Department of Mathematics (2008-2011).
The first contribution of this work is constructing two quantum-safe lattice-based Direct Anonymous Attestation protocols from lattice assumptions. Compared to the only other lattice-based DAA scheme with conjectured post-quantum security available in the related art, the first proposed lattice-based DAA (LDAA) the protocol ensures that the storage requirements of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) are reduced twofold and the signature sizes five times. Moreover, experimental results show that the signing and verification operations are accelerated 1.1 and 2.0 times, respectively. To achieve more efficiency, we constructed a compact quantum-safe lattice-based Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol whose signature size is around 2MB, which is (at least) two orders of magnitude smaller compared to existing post-quantum DAA schemes. The security of both proposed lattice-based DAA schemes is proved in the Universal Composability (UC) model under the assumed hardness of the Ring-Short Integer Solution (Ring-SIS) and the Ring-Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) problems. This work is a contribution to the European H2020 FutureTPM project and the final result of this work may lead to a post-quantum DAA scheme that is suitable for inclusion in a future quantum-resistant TPM.
The second contribution of this work is a new Lattice-based EPID (LEPID) protocol. Inspired by our work on lattice-based DAA schemes, we present the first Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) scheme, supported on lattice primitives, that may benefit from future research developments in post-quantum cryptography.
We also give a new security model for the EPID in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. The proposed LEPID scheme is proved secure under the new model.
The third contribution deals with the DAA join protocol when the TPM uses two different keys for the purpose of user privacy. An Endorsement Key (EK) which is used to identify the TPM and an Attestation Key (AK) used for TPM attestation services. Using two different keys result with a