3:30pm - 5pm
Wednesday 21 October 2020

Theory Webinar: "Signalling Covertly Acquired Information"

Dr. Nenad Kos (Bocconi University) is presenting his latest work. Nenad's research is on microeconomic theory, with a focus on mechanism design, signalling and information.


University of Surrey

 Zoom Meeting: https://surrey-ac.zoom.us/j/91861466446

Meeting ID: 918 6146 6446

Title: Signalling Covertly Acquired Information


We study the interplay between information acquisition and signalling. A sender decides whether to learn his type at a cost prior to taking a signalling action. A receiver observes the signalling action and responds. In the benchmark model where the sender’s information acquisition decision is observed the sender does not acquire information and, therefore, does not signal. A rationale for signalling is provided by the model in which information acquisition is covert. There, in the unique equilibrium outcome surviving a form of never weak best response refinement the sender does acquire information and signals when the information is cheap. A novel link is established between the cost of information and the amount of signalling: as information becomes more expensive, the sender engages in more signalling.

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