Dr Ellis Mallett


PhD Politics (University of Surrey); MA Diplomacy & Foreign Policy (Lancaster University); BA (Hons) History & International Politics (MMU)

About

My research project

University roles and responsibilities

  • Research Assistant, Centre for Britain and Europe
  • Junior Fellow, Centre for International Intervention
  • PGR Seminars & Events Lead 2020/21
  • Postgraduate Research Representative for the Department of Politics 2020/21

    My qualifications

    2021
    Graduate Certificate in Learning and Teaching
    University of Surrey
    2018
    MA Diplomacy & Foreign Policy
    Lancaster University, Distinction
    2017
    BA (Hons) International Politics with History
    Manchester Metropolitan University, 2.1

    Affiliations and memberships

    BISA
    British International Studies Association

    Research

    Research interests

    Research projects

    Indicators of esteem

    • Santander PhD Mobility Award (£2000 travel grant), University of Surrey

    • Doctoral College Studentship Award, University of Surrey

    • Mahindra Naraine Memorial Prize for best overall performance in MA Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University

       

    Teaching

    Publications

    Ellis Robyn Mallett, Thomas Juneau (2023)A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Overbalancing, In: Global Studies Quarterly3(2)ksad023 Oxford University Press

    Why do states overestimate threats and, as a result, mount disproportionately strong and therefore costly balancing responses? To answer this question, we build a neoclassical realist theory of overbalancing to argue that unit-level intervening variables help generate a counterforce greater than what a structurally induced ideal response would call for. We identify the factors and conditions that steer states to deviate from realist, optimal policies, pinpoint the consequences of such suboptimal behavior , and provide policymakers with recommendations more suited to an interest-driven foreign policy in line with power considerations. We apply our theory to two distinct case studies: Egypt's costly intervention in Yemen in the 1960s and the American overreaction to the real, but very limited, threat posed by terrorism since 2001.