Ellis Mallett

My thesis theorises overbalancing behaviour using neoclassical realism to explain the conditions under which, and the reasons why, states overreact to marginal threats to their own detriment. Waltzian balance of power logic is unable to elucidate on such behaviour, which this research suggests is suboptimal as a strategic focus on areas of peripheral interest results in the deflection of important diplomatic capital and material resource from more salient foreign policy issues.

It uses US foreign policy towards Iran and Cuba as its case study, and  employs semi-structured elite interviews and document analysis to demonstrate that existing policies have been driven by prevailing ideational forces at the unit level, rather than an objective assessment of strategic interest defined as power would suggest. American foreign policy elites have become irreflective and non-contemplative about the framework of ideas within which their Iran and Cuba policies are construed. The persistence of an outdated, Cold War paradigm causes continuous overreactions, leading to policy failures and resulting in an inability to strategically adjust to the realities of systemic stimuli.

As such, the thesis is interested in how the Obama administration in particular approached such an institutionalised policy in order to properly restore the balance of these relationships. Broadly, the thesis highlights the conditions under which overbalancing occurs, the consequences of the punishment that results, and seeks to understand what must happen in order for states to correct their course and pursue an optimal path in foreign policy.