This ground breaking text provides the ideal introduction to the ever-changing field of foreign policy. With a unique combination of theories, actors and cases in a single volume, the expert contributors provide students with a valuable and accessible introduction to what foreign policy is and how it is conducted.
With an emphasis throughout on grounding theory in empirical examples, the textbook features a section dedicated to relevant and topical case studies where foreign policy analysis approaches and theories are applied.
The expert team of contributors clearly conveys the connection between international relations theory, political science, and the development of foreign policy analysis, emphasizing the key debates in the academic community.
President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's first meeting was bound to make waves. Social media was fixated by which of the two statesman best managed the handshake. The prime minister was generally applauded for avoiding being hauled into the president's physical sphere of influence. Images showed the two leaders at press podia and in armchairs by the Oval Office desk: separate but generally comfortable. It was not exactly the chummy camaraderie Trudeau enjoyed previously with President Barack Obama. And while there was no high-vaunting rhetoric to match John F. Kennedy's 1961 encomium that "geography has made us neighbours, history has made us friends, economics has made us partners, and necessity has made us allies", the focus on renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) certainly accentuated the challenges of geography and economics.
2-part Blog examining the UK government's original 2 proposals to tackle customs at its borders, the particularities of the Irish border itself, and the 3 options facing the UK, the EU, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
Tune in for another episode of ?Make America Great Again!? You?ll remember June?s episodes saw President Trump scupper the Canadian G7, cozy up to Kim Jong-Un and instigate wide-ranging steel and aluminium tariffs against the EU, Canada and Mexico.
De-sensitized as we?ve become to Trumpian geopolitics, we were unprepared for the untrammeled lunacy of July. Pissing off the Canadians was clearly just the beginning.
A 2-part blog appraising the 104-page June White Paper on ?The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union? and the ensuing Cabinet split over the 'Chequers deal', national tensions within Britain itself during summer 2018, and subsequent impact on UK-EU Brexit negotiations.
This article examines the role that education plays in European Union (EU) integration. We ask whether efforts which historically have been designed to endow European students with a ?knowledge of Europe? in terms of an understanding of culture, politics and sensibility have been circumscribed by, or augmented, by the recently inaugurated Europe of Knowledge project. We argue that the renowned Erasmus mobility programme, a flagship of European higher education innovation, may, in light of critical challenges to the Eurozone and the EU project, be recasting itself along its initial 1987 objectives: enhancing a sense of European identity amongst participating exchange students while endowing them with transferrable skills designed to strengthen current weaknesses in the European internal market. We suggest that the initial, integration-fostering, identity-building goals of Erasmus concomitant with ?growing a Union?, have since 2009 and in the continuation of the Eurozone financial crisis, been progressively replaced by the acquisition of transferable skills necessary to boost employability and drive economic recovery through enhanced labour mobility. As the majority of European labour markets struggle to regain their momentum, we question whether European students participating in the Erasmus programme emerge as merely ?skilled? rather than ?schooled? in a wider knowledge of Europe intended by the programme?s founders. Surveying students regarding their perceptions of European and national identities, this article concludes that education through mobility remains a highly significant and viable means of constructing and reconstructing identity and European integration, even in a time of economic crisis.
North American scholars typically do not hesitate to make pronouncements about foreign policy processes and outcomes in other countries. And despite ample evidence to the contrary, the perception that foreign policy analysis is still largely a North American scholarly enterprise persists. Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America challenges this perception, providing a rich overview of work by scholars in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and also highlighting theoretical and empirical insights that may catalyze new waves of progress in the field.
The post-war heritage, institutional similarities, and policy motivations shared between commonwealth entities and contemporary international organisations, and their subsequent impact on soft power represents a wealth of unexplored potential.
Foreign Policies of EU Member States provides a clear and current overview of the motivations and outcomes of EU Member States regarding their foreign policy-making within and beyond the EU. It provides an in-depth analysis of intra-EU policy-making and sheds light, in an innovative and understandable way, on the lesser-known aspects of the inter-EU and extra-EU foreign policies of the twenty-eight Member States. The text has an innovative method of thematic organisation in which case study state profiles emerge via dominant foreign policy themes. The text examines the three main policy challenges currently faced by the twenty-eight Member States:
" First, EU Member States must cooperate within the mechanisms of the EU, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
" Second, EU Member States continue to construct their own inter-EU foreign policies.
" Third, the sovereign prerogative exercised by all EU Member States is to construct their own foreign policies on everything from trade and defence with the rest of the world.
This chapter explores how effectively the energy-development nexus contributed to the coherence and consistency of the overall EU foreign policy. It suggests that energy sectors in developing countries and development policy in general have two key features in common: capacity building and sustainability. The chapter contributes to the burgeoning interest in the area by assessing the role of energy in Africa (subsistence, climate change and export potential). It looks in detail at the extant energy-development policy nexus within EU-ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) development strategies such as the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), and the role of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). In its market aspects, energy is a core shared competence, where the EU implements market mechanisms to encourage liberal trade and enhanced competition. The chapter concludes by considering the overall impact that development and energy security have upon the coherence and consistency of EU foreign policy.
Summits are tricky. Last week?s EU summit (28-29 June) was predicted to be a tough one, with division between Europe?s leaders over migration, and anxiety about the Brexit timetable. In one area however, European harmony shone more brightly. While migration talks dragged on with somewhat opaque results, EU Member State heads were able to swiftly agree on proposals to strengthen inter-EU defence cooperation, and most notably on project PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation).
The multidimensional crisis of European integration, explored in this volume, has generated both negative and positive images of the European Union (EU). Critics argue that the EU has lost its superiority as an international economic player, that its soft power foreign policy lacks credibility, and that its response to key crises have critically impaired both its institutional integrity and its overall presence. Such views now appear particularly salient in light of the June 2016 UK Referendum. Supporters contend that despite these setbacks, the EU?s global image remains intact, based on its commitment to development policy, humanitarian assistance, and climate change mitigation; to promoting peace and stability in the Western Balkans; and to reforming Eurozone governance.
One recent but major policy occurrence in Justice and Home Affairs ? the Treaty of Prüm (2005) ? has developed within the framework of differentiated integration, thus reopening the debate over the impact of flexibility on EU integration, what causes it, and whether it should be sought by Member States at all. Whatever the consensus, the debate itself demonstrates that the very idea of differentiated integration deserves a renewed attention today ultimately because it affects, in one way or another, the performance of the EU. This article presents a critical analysis of the practice of differentiation in Justice and Home Affairs, by examining its forms, principles and effects. It discusses the literature on the subject, emphasizing the complexity of flexible integration, but reaches different conclusions. Thus, in contrast to the dominant argument, we argue that differentiation is not necessarily about deepening and/or widening EU integration. It is also, and sometimes primarily, about power and interests, two major elements that feed mistrust among Member States. In fact, we demonstrate that mistrust can cause poor differentiation. Moreover, in the absence of trust among Member States, flexibility might contribute to sub-optimal policies. Based on past research and interviews, we substantiate our claim by investigating the driving factors, rationales and consequences of the Treaty of Prüm on the institutionalization of a EU area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
Education has emerged as an increasingly rewarding, but highly ambiguous form of foreign policy. Shifting from a domestic dynamic, constructed via internal processes for reasons of national self-identity, the internationalization of education has emerged as one of the most salient trends in higher education across the globe (CBIE 2011, 3), and become a clear component in the foreign policies of states and institutions alike. While scholarly investigation into foreign policy and education have in and of themselves remained popular areas of interest within the political and social sciences, exploring ways in which education is operating as a vehicle of twenty-first century foreign policy, as well as looking at how foreign policy content and ambitions are beginning to impact on the substance and structure of higher education is a relatively new field. This paper explores the role of contemporary higher education in European Union, and Canadian foreign policy terrains.
Reliance on energy resources is inextricably linked to energy security. Whether dependent upon energy imports or exports, all states, regions and companies strive to reduce the risks associated with resource dependence by linking energy with their own security. Ensuring access to energy resources involves negotiating with a variety of external actors. As a result, energy is deeply connected to the external affairs of political and commercial actors alike. Within this terrain Russia and the EU emerge as very different energy actors. Indeed, the two are polar opposites in their ability to tackle the geo-economic asymmetry of importers and exporters, the structural unevenness in market versus governmental authority over energy resources and the geopolitical imbalances arising from differing perceptions of energy's role in foreign and security policy. This article examines the rise and fall of the EU?Russia Energy Dialogue. Launched in 2000 as a sector-specific forum with the capacity to engineer change in a host of other areas, the dialogue is now all but defunct, the victim of increased diplomatic fallout between the EU and Russia over political and energy issues. An overview of the key policy papers of the EU?Russia Energy Dialogue illustrates that the generic demands of energy security take on particularist orientations depending on the geo-economic and geopolitical circumstances of a given energy actor. Dialogue documents illustrate that the two sides ultimately understand energy security in very different ways. Now a viable component part of Russian national and foreign policy in its post-Cold War reconstruction, energy security is perceived by the EU in a rather more holistic way, and remains an unwieldy policy instrument.
The concept of EU à la carte is an interesting one. For some, it invokes images of scattered states,unreconciled policies and unworkable objectives. For others, it suggests areas of complementarity that ultimately makes collaboration possible. EU à la carte options wax and wane according to the health of the overall EU enterprise, and the suitability of key mechanisms like integration and governance. When the latter encounter problems in providing collective solutions, then the benefits of flexible à la carte options are routinely suggested. But à la carte operations are risky and complex. As a non-uniform method of European integration, they operate via centrifugal philosophies which generally make a virtue of the peripheral, rather than a necessity of the centre.
Can one strike a balance between the deep demands of integration, and a pragmatic use of looser approaches? The EU may need to. Collective approaches typify the EU?s pioneering approaches to climate change, but energy security remains defiantly geopolitical in nature. Whilst energy security continues to be determined by national foreign policy dynamics, à la carte mechanisms may be a helpful way of bypassing the current stasis in Europe?s energy mainframe. Could à la carte go even further? Some of the software and hardware, and even decarbonisation goals of the European Energy Union (EEU) could be accomplished in the short term by allowing Member States to achieve initial goals at different speeds and varying methods. This has the advantage of getting the general structure of the EEU completed, as well as retaining the inputs of non-EU Member States (and those swiftly heading for the exit). But achieving the security of the EEU is a tougher battle, requiring solidarity rather than symmetry. Energy security is the minimum objective, but it requires a maximum of input. À la carte mechanisms may work, but it would have to do so in a way that achieves genuine regional balance and between vulnerable states and the strategic imperatives of the EEU as a whole.
History, it may be argued, has been unkind to some states and downright vicious to others. Few regions ? ancient or modern ? are home to the combustible mix of divergent geographic, ethnic, religious and tribal allegiances as the Balkans. Fewer still have undergone the transition from rabid internecine strife to nascent democratic legitimization, as have the post-Yugoslav states of the Balkan region.
This chapter examines the conceptual assumptions that underlie Erasmus: the EU's most successful student mobility scheme. Originally designed to inspire a new 'geography of European youth', Erasmus provides ambiguous outcomes in terms of generating a deepened sense of European identity. A European youth demographic clearly exists, but its ability to support European integration through specific dynamics of identity, association, and skill generation have been undermined internally by a lack of clarity regarding the current purpose of Erasmus, and externally by the upheavals of enlargement and the Eurozone crisis.
As a result of the 2004 ?big bang? enlargement and its subsequent 2007 expansion, the European Union (EU) has undergone a dramatic transformation in both its internal composition and the geopolitical make-up of its new peripheries.2 Recognised as the EU?s most successful foreign policy, enlargement has established the young Union as a regional actor of considerable political, economic and normative power, capable of having generated a wave of institutional reforms across eastern and central Europe. However enlargement has also raised the stakes of geopolitical stability significantly; first by unveiling a swathe of new countries on its eastern borders, prompting the question of how the EU should best manage its relationship these new neighbours.3 Some nations in these new frontiers may well yet be included in the Union fold; others appear destined to remain on the outside. Secondly, enlargement has also resurrected the issue of Europe?s ?old neighbours?, who inhabit the Mediterranean and whose engagement with Europe has been sporadic and awkward. Neighbours old and new represent a challenge to the internal composition of the EU and its extended frontiers, thrusting onto the agenda the uneasy issue of the qualitative goals of the Union as a regional actor and the apparently quantitative issue of its absorption capacity. This constitutes a third, more existential challenge, that of the ultimate identity of the EU, present and future.
The EU's neighbourhood policy remains a conundrum. With a multitude of objectives, the project was inspired by the goal of fostering stability, security and prosperity in a shared neighbourhood. Member States themselves have made use of the ENP as a vehicle to balance EU goals of transformation with the demands of their own national foreign policies.
In the October 2015 elections, the charismatic Justin Trudeau led the Canadian Liberal Party to its first majority government in 15 years, overturning nearly a decade of conservative government. His premiership is generally considered to have begun well. This article examines Trudeau?s conduct of the election campaign, his choice of a young and diverse Cabinet, his courtship of the media and image making, and assesses changes in foreign and domestic policy. These have yet to prove substantive but Trudeau has signalled a reversal of Stephen Harper?s conservative policies and especially in regard to migration has tapped into images of ?compassionate Canadians?. In foreign policy, this has been evidenced in relations with the United States and with a re-engagement with the Commonwealth especially in its soft power aspects. Trudeau?s green credentials and stance on Climate Change are a contrast to those of his predecessor but he has yet to confront the different environmental profiles and policies of the Canadian states. Canada?s Strategic Partnership with the European Community and the ratification of CETA are priorities and he has to come to terms with the implications of Brexit.
A two-part blog appraising 2018 US-Canada tariff tensions, the 2018 Canadian G7, and subsequent North American relations.
This report is focused for the most part on the 'Kent imperatives' arising in the short and medium term (2019-2021) in the health and social care sector. However, as indicated below, and in the recommendations, further research will clearly be needed to assist decision-makers and stakeholders in making decisions that are both sensible to and sensitive of the specific conditions of Kent and Medway.
Few events demand a wholesale reset of key policies. But Brexit is one of them. The foreign policy challenges arising for both Britain and its European partners are considerable.
Foreign policy is something of a paradox. Scholars are taught about the
long-standing axioms of statehood, and schooled in the age-old verities
of conflict and cooperation. Pragmatic policies, as Kissinger reminds us,
?must be based on some fixed principles in order to prevent tactical skill
from dissipating into a random thrashing about? (Kissinger 1994, 98).
Policymakers, however, operate on rather less fixed requirements of cost?
benefit analysis and strategy construction, often requiring swift changes
in the practice of statecraft.
Brexit has provoked all manner of clashes, from trade to fisheries, from funding to the colour of passports. It's the tip of the iceberg. As the EU Withdrawal Bill makes clear, the ability to restructure the governing power of Britain itself is at stake. This blog examines the power play between the English regions, local governments, and Westminster against the backdrop of Brexit.
In December 2016 CEFEUS published its first report, entitled 'Kent and Medway: Making a Success of Brexit'. It was launched at a reception in Westminster, hosted by Helen Whately, MP for Faversham and Mid Kent. The launch was attended by many of the individuals, organisations stakeholders who had contributed since May 2016 to the work of preparing the report. As we said at that time: ?If we are to make a genuine success of Brexit for all our communities across Kent and Medway we must ensure we take fully into account the various concerns that lie behind the vote for Brexit?.
Kuzemko C., Hadfield A. (2016) Defining and projecting EU energy policy,In: EU Leadership in Energy and Enviornmental Governance? Global and Local Challenges and Responses pp. 21-50
What is EU energy policy ? and how successful is the EU in projecting it? Of course, posing questions about the nature of EU energy policy presumes that the EU has a collective energy policy. This has been a slowly emerging and contested area of EU competence ? certainly in comparison with other sectors. The question of what EU energy policy is can be answered by pointing to the three ?pillars? that have historically constituted the objectives of EU energy policy: climate-change mitigation, energy supply security and establishing competitive, integrated markets (EC 2013a). EU energy policy might in this way be explained as the application of various strategies and instruments, and the establishment of institutions, in pursuit of these three objectives.
This is the fifth of the Kent and Medway Brexit Impact Assessment reports, this one focusing on the impacts of Brexit in the short and medium term on the county of Kent, with a particular focus on border management issues, taking into account socio-economic impacts, policing, freight and logistics, altered customs arrangements, and a series of 7 port profiles, including Dover and Calais. It was launched on 13 November 2018 in both Westminster, and in Kent, at CCCU, and was authored by the Centre for European Studies and the Canterbury Centre for Policing Research.
Under the current proposals, the EU development cooperation budget would increase by 30%. This paper explores how this potential increase is designed to assist the EU in consolidating its international identity in line with the aims of the Global Strategy (EUGS) by better aligning the money in the development budget to the global ambitions of the EU. This has reignited concerns that this represents further politicisation of the development activities of the EU beyond the Treaty commitment to poverty reduction and once again highlights the tension between development goals and broader strategic goals. This paper explores this tension between development and strategic goals in what is clearly a moving target area. Comparing how the vision for EU development policy has evolved between the 2006 and 2017 Consensus? on Development provides the context for a comparison to broader vision for external action set out in the EU?s Global Strategy. The paper then explores the proposed budget reforms in light of this comparison highlighting the implications for the EU as a development actor. It shows how discussions around the size of the EU budget coincide with Brexit and the re-negotiation of the EU?s relationship with a key group of developing countries, the ACP. It shows that the future negotiations will focus on the overall amount of the EU development budget, how the budget will be used and where ? decisions that will shine a light onto the priorities of the EU as a development actor.
Under the current proposals, the EU development cooperation budget would increase by 30%. This paper explores how this potential increase is designed to assist the EU in consolidating its international identity in line with the aims of the Global Strategy (EUGS) by better aligning the money in the development budget to the global ambitions of the EU. This has reignited concerns that this represents further politicisation of the development activities of the EU beyond the Treaty commitment to poverty reduction and once again highlights the tension between development goals and broader strategic goals. This paper explores this tension between development and strategic goals in what is clearly a moving target area. Comparing how the vision for EU development policy has evolved between the 2006 and 2017 Consensus? on Development provides the context for a comparison to broader vision for external action set out in the EU?s Global Strategy. The paper then explores the proposed budget reforms in light of this comparison highlighting the implications for the EU as a development actor. It shows how discussions around the size of the EU budget coincide with Brexit and the renegotiation of the EU?s relationship with a key group of developing countries, the ACP. It shows that the future negotiations will focus on the overall amount of the EU development budget, how the budget will be used and where ? decisions that will shine a light onto the priorities of the EU as a development actor.