Professor Yu Xiong

The growing energy consumption and associated carbon emission of Bitcoin mining could potentially undermine global sustainable efforts. By investigating carbon emission flows of Bitcoin blockchain operation in China with a simulation-based Bitcoin blockchain carbon emission model, we find that without any policy interventions, the annual energy consumption of the Bitcoin blockchain in China is expected to peak in 2024 at 296.59 Twh and generate 130.50 million metric tons of carbon emission correspondingly. Internationally, this emission output would exceed the total annualized greenhouse gas emission output of the Czech Republic and Qatar. Domestically, it ranks in the top 10 among 182 cities and 42 industrial sectors in China. In this work, we show that moving away from the current punitive carbon tax policy to a site regulation policy which induces changes in the energy consumption structure of the mining activities is more effective in limiting carbon emission of Bitcoin blockchain operation. The growing energy consumption and carbon emissions of Bitcoin mining could potentially undermine global sustainability efforts. Here, the authors show the annual energy consumption of the Bitcoin blockchain in China is expected to peak in 2024 at 296.59 Twh and generate 130.50 million metric tons of carbon emissions.

The knowledge-based view (KBV) theory argues that organisations gain a competitive advantage by adopting strategies to capitalise on their knowledge resources, e.g., organisational culture, managerial decision-making and innovative new processes. Large organisations partner with external technology suppliers to develop such technology-driven processes. However, within the context of large organisations, there remains a lack of insight into the motivation and structures of how and why large organisations collaborate with external partners to create such technology-driven processes. To explore the identified problem of understanding the collaborating mechanisms that contribute to technology-driven process innovation in large manufacturing organisations, we analyse and develop inductive concepts using multiple data points. Our research illustrates that external technology partners act as a mediating influence in process-innovation projects by contributing to the capabilities or capacity of an organisation.

•This is the first analytical paper which studies anti-counterfeiting in a retail platform under dual-channel competition.•This work is the first one focusing on the incentives for the platform and the manufacturer to invest in anti-counterfeiting technology under dual-channel competition.•We uncover that the payoff of anti-counterfeiting in the retail platform is not always positive and anti-counterfeiting may harm consumer surplus and social welfare. The retail platform has developed rapidly, but the problem of fake products has also become increasingly severe. This paper investigates the impact of anti-counterfeiting in a retail platform and the incentives for the platform and the manufacturer to invest in anti-counterfeiting technology by using a game-theoretic model. We consider that the product can be sold directly by the manufacturer, or indirectly through a reseller on the platform. The reseller might also sell fake products, but the platform and the manufacturer can use anti-counterfeiting technology to fight against the fakes. Our analysis shows that the payoff of anti-counterfeiting in the retail platform is not always positive. Specifically, when the production valuation is low, the anti-counterfeiting payoff for the platform (the manufacturer) is negative if the proportion of fakes is sufficiently low (high). We also find that anti-counterfeiting may harm consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, if the investment cost of anti-counterfeiting is high, at most one firm, either the platform or the manufacturer, has the incentive to invest in anti-counterfeiting contingent on the relative valuation on the platform’s services. Finally, with the investment in anti-counterfeiting, the platform should provide better services than before for surviving in the market.

•Green optimism is optimistic bias about consumer environmental awareness.•We investigate the impacts of green optimism on sustainable supply chain management.•We find green optimism might discourage investment in green product development.•The retailer can benefit from green optimism, but the manufacturer cannot.•Green optimism might be detrimental to firms, consumers, and the environment. In recent years, managers have increasingly integrated sustainability into their business models. However, they might overestimate the premium that average consumers are willing to pay for the environment. In this paper, we formulate a game-theoretical model that illustrates the impacts of green optimism which refers to managers’ optimistic bias about consumer environmental awareness. We consider a sustainable supply chain in which one manufacturer invests in green product development and sells the green product through one retailer. Each firm within the supply chain is operated by one manager who is either realistic or optimistic. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that managers’ optimistic bias might discourage investment in green product development. We also find that green optimism is always detrimental to the upstream manufacturer, but might be beneficial to the downstream retailer. Surprisingly, under certain conditions, green optimism can be detrimental to all stakeholders, i.e., firms in the supply chain, consumers, and the environment. This study suggests an interesting link between supply chain management and human resource management; that is, within a sustainable supply chain those managers who are optimistic about the future of green business might be an obstacle to the success of green business.

•Coproducts made of leftover materials are strongly attractive to green consumers.•Coproduction technology can be adopted by one OEM or one CM.•The raw material cost has non-monotone impacts on the optimal coproduction strategy.•The fraction of the green customer segment has non-monotone impacts on the CM’s profit.•The adoption of coproduction technology may make the environment worse off. In recent years, coproduction technology has been developed and adopted by many third-party coproduct manufacturers (CMs). Coproducts made of leftover materials from traditional manufacturing are strongly attractive to green consumers who are willing to pay a price premium for environmental protection. However, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) might hesitate to adopt coproduction technology because the coproduct cannibalizes the sales of their traditional products. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretical model to investigate the economic and environmental implications of coproduction that can be leveraged by one OEM or one CM. We find that, from the OEM’s perspective, the dominant strategy can be OEM coproduction, CM coproduction, or No coproduction, which is contingent on the demand from green consumers and the supply of raw materials. We also find that the size of green consumers and the unit cost of raw materials have non-monotone impacts on the CM’s profit. Interestingly, an enlarging size of green consumers might hurt the CM, while an increasing cost of raw materials might benefit the CM. Although coproduction recovers the value of leftover materials, the adoption of coproduction technology increases the total material consumption and the total material waste when the unit cost of raw materials is sufficiently high, making the environment worse off.

Previous studies have shed light on the effects of the adoption of OHSAS (Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series) 18,001 certification on performance. One important factor that has been neglected so far is the adoption timing. The question of whether early OHSAS 18001 adopters achieve better financial performance and operational performance than do late adopters (or vice versa) remains unanswered. We develop hypotheses and then analyze the secondary longitudinal data of listed Chinese manufacturing firms by employing a rigorous event study approach and performing regressions. The results indicate that early adopters enjoy significantly greater performance gains than do late adopters and this can be explained by institutional theory. We find that early adopters of OHSAS 18001 certification motivated by normative pressure realize additional financial performance from the second year to the fourth year after adoption, and the early adopter advantages of improved labor productivity can at least last in the medium term, but late adopters motivated by coercive and mimetic pressure only benefit in the preparation year. Moreover, early adoption is more favorable to firms with high labor intensity and low internationalization level. Thus, this study extends research in understanding the effects of OHSAS 18001 on firm performance and suggest new insights to the implementation of occupational health and safety practices.

The aim of this special issue was to investigate the mechanisms behind China’s innovation ecosystem by focusing on the key participants within it: firms, research institutes, governments and intermediaries, supply-chain systems and so forth. There were interesting threads connecting research on innovation participants throughout the submitted papers. Briefly, the following topics were addressed: 1. evaluation of China’s innovation performance at a regional level and recognition of successful practices as well as problem issues; 2. the influence at a micro level of uniquely Chinese factors on firms’ innovation performance - for instance, how has the regulatory context (e.g., state ownership, industry policy) shaped corporate innovation activities? 3. the relative importance of government and industry support mechanisms; 4. the roles of Chinese state research institutes and the significance of their network positions (e.g. structural hole and centrality) on innovation performance.

Different stakeholders are educating consumers about the benefits of remanufacturing. By increasing the number of consumers who are willing to purchase remanufactured products, consumer education has been expected to facilitate the advancement of the remanufacturing sector. We formally validate the condition under which consumer education is indeed beneficial from a social planner's perspective. We develop a game-theoretical model to examine the implications of consumer education upon a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier. The manufacturer can perform remanufacturing at the component level. The direct effect of consumer education is that more consumers are willing to pay for the remanufactured product. Although the optimal remanufactured product quantity, in general, increases in the presence of consumer education, surprisingly, our analysis identifies a consumer education paradox, that is, as more consumers are willing to pay for the remanufactured product, the manufacturer switches the choice from remanufacturing to no remanufacturing. Moreover, consumer education could be detrimental to the supply chain, consumers, and the environment because of the paradox. Fortunately, temperate consumer education might be all-around desirable if and only if ex-ante few consumers are willing to purchase remanufactured products; that is, from the social planner's perspective, temperate consumer education should be conducted to foster the remanufacturing sector in its infancy.

Cannibalisation is still a concern for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) when they outsource remanufacturing operations to the authorised remanufacturers (ARs). In dealing with the cannibalisation in remanufacturing outsourcing, many OEMs (such as Sun, Apple, Hewlett Packard, Bosch Tools, and Gateway) use core collecting or remanufactured product remarketing. Motivated by examples from industry, we develop two models in which an OEM produces new products but outsources remanufacturing operations to a AR. The two potential strategies for dealing with the cannibalisation from remanufacturing outsourcing are: (1) collecting used cores from consumers, or (2) remarketing all remanufactured products to consumers. Among other results, we find that minimising cannibalisation problems does not equate with maximising profits. In particular, if the collection cost coefficient is not pronounced, the aggressive response by the OEM can effectively minimise the cannibalisation problems, but will reduce the profitability for the OEM on the other hand. Further, as the collection cost coefficient is moderate, remarketing remanufactured products can secure Pareto improvements. As such, we suggest that, practising managers should combine the cannibalisation problems of remanufacturing with the costs of collecting used cores.