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Dr David Rose

Visiting Reader
BSc, PhD, MPhil

Academic and research departments

School of Psychology.


My qualifications

BSc Psychology
University of Bristol
PhD Neurophysiology
University of Cambridge
MPhil History and Philosophy of Science
University of Cambridge

Affiliations and memberships

Applied Vision Association
Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness
Experimental Psychology Society
Federation of European Neuroscience Societies


Research interests

My publications


Strasburger, H., Huber, J., & Rose, D. (2018). Ewald Hering’s (1899) On the Limits of Visual Acuity: A Translation and Commentary
With a Supplement on Alfred Volkmann’s (1863) Physiological Investigations in the Field of Optics
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Towards the end of the 19th Century, Hering and Helmholtz were arguing about the fineness of visual acuity. In a talk given in 1899, Hering finally established beyond reasonable doubt that humans can see spatial displacements smaller than the diameter of a foveal cone receptor, an ability we nowadays call ‘hyperacuity’ and still the topic of active research. Hering suggested that this ability is made manifest by averaging across the range of locations stimulated during miniature eye movements. However, this idea was made most clear only in a footnote to this (not well known) publication of his talk and so was missed by many subsequent workers. Accordingly, particularly towards the end of the 20th Century, Hering has commonly been mis-cited as having proposed in this paper that averaging occurs purely along the lengths of the edges in the image. Here, we present in translation what Hering actually said and why. In Supplementary Material, we additionally translate accounts of some background experiments by Volkmann (1863) that were cited by Hering.
Rose, D. (2018). Review of Shapiro, A. G., & Todorovic ́, D. (Eds.). The Oxford Compendium of Visual Illusions. Oxford University Press.
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In their Introduction, the Editors say the first 10 chapters delve into foundational principles such as the nature and definition of illusions and what if anything unites and explains them all. They briefly raise the questions of realism in perception and of the philosophy of science (such as how observations always seem to induce multiple explanations based on differing principles, leading to persisting disagreements and the ignoring of empirical counterexamples). The remaining 80% of the book comprises 105 brief (3–12 pages) chapters which describe a plethora of specific examples and types of illusion, in some cases with a degree of explanatory investigation and elaboration. In this review I critique the foundational chapters in some detail, as well as discussing the overall value of the book (both scientific and pecuniary).
Longworth, C., Deakins, J., Rose, D. & Gracey, F. (2018). The nature of self-esteem and its relationship to anxiety and depression in adult acquired brain injury
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Acquired brain injury (ABI) has a negative impact on self-esteem, which is in turn associated with mood disorders, maladaptive coping and reduced community participation. The aim of the current research was to explore self-esteem as a multi- dimensional construct and identify which factors are associated with symptoms of anxiety or depression. Eighty adults with ABI aged 17–56 years completed the Robson Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), of whom 65 also completed the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; 57.5% of the sample had clinically low self-esteem. The RSES had good internal consistency (alpha = .89), and factor analysis identified four factors, which differed from those found previously in other populations. Multiple regression analysis revealed anxiety was differentially predicted by “Self-Worth” and “Self-Efficacy”, R squared = .44, F(4, 58) = 9, p < .001, and depression by “Self-Regard”, R squared = .38, F(4, 58) = 9, p < .001. A fourth factor, “Confidence”, did not predict depression or anxiety. In conclusion, the RSES is a reliable measure of self-esteem after ABI. Self-esteem after ABI is multidimensional and differs in structure from self- esteem in the general population. A multidimensional model of self-esteem may be helpful in development of transdiagnostic cognitive behavioural accounts of adjustment.
Rose, D. (2012). Consciousness: distinguishing two types of level and of causation
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Levels of processing are not the same as levels of organization. Causation (efficient v formal), constraint and control are also different. Efficient causation runs horizontally not downward. The Darwinian worldview is Heraclitean not Parmenidean. Consciousness emerges with levels of organization not processing.
Rose, D. & Brown, D. (2015). Idealism and materialism in perception
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Koenderink (2014, , , 1–6) has said most readers are deluded, because they believe an ‘All Seeing Eye’ observes an objective reality. We trace the source of Koenderink’s assertion to his metaphysical idealism, and point to two major weaknesses in his position—namely, its dualism and foundationalism. We counter with arguments from modern philosophy of science for the existence of an objective material reality, contrast Koenderink’s enactivism to his idealism, and point to ways in which phenomenology and cognitive science are complementary and not mutually exclusive.
Rose, D. (2012). Three dimensions of psychosemantics
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What is meaning? The question has a long history in both ‘western’ analytic philosophy (e.g. Ogden & Richards 1923; Putnam 1975; Garfield 2000; Millikan 2004) and in the ‘continental’ phenomenological tradition. Perhaps the most commonly used definition involves the aboutness or intentionality of mental states (Brentano 1874). How such states acquire their meaning is another matter, however. Here, I will argue there is no single mechanism, and hence no simple answer or definition. I will follow first the approach taken by analytic philosophy and cognitive science, then show how this has been extended recently by adding extra factors to form a more complex theory structure. Specifically, I will describe three conceptual dimensions to psychosemantics that need to be recognised.
Brown, D., Rose, D. & Lyons, E. (2009). Self-generated expressions of residual complaints following brain injury
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Following brain injury there is often a prolonged period of deteriorating psychological condition, despite neurological stability or improvement. This is presumably consequent to the remission of anosognosia and the realisation of permanently worsened status. This change is hypothesised to be directed partially by the socially mediated processes which play a role in generating self-awareness and which here direct the reconstruction of the self as a permanently injured person. However, before we can understand this process of redevelopment, we need an unbiassed technique to monitor self-awareness. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 individuals with long-standing brain injuries to capture their spontaneous complaints and their level of insight into the implications of their difficulties. The focus was on what the participants said in their own words, and the extent to which self-knowledge of difficulties was spontaneously salient to the participants. Their responses were subjected to content analysis. Most participants were able to say that they had brain injuries and physical difficulties, many mentioned memory and attentional problems and a few made references to a variety of emotional disturbances. Content analysis of data from unbiassed interviews can reveal the extent to which people with brain injuries know about their difficulties. Social constructionist accounts of self-awareness and recovery are supported.
Rose, D. & Clarke, T.J. (2009). Look who's talking: visual detection of speech from whole-body biological motion cues during emotive interpersonal conversation
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Biological motion stimuli contain a great deal of information about the person and action depicted. Here, we extend the known range by showing that viewers can see which member of a pair of conversing actors is talking. Moreover, the ability varies with the emotional content of the conversation. The implications for social cognitive neuroscience are discussed.
Rose, D., transl. Osaka, N. (2008). 意識の脳内表現―心理学と哲学からのアプローチ
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本書は、哲学・心理学・脳科学が交差する領域に新しく誕生しつつある「意識科学」の現在の姿を体系的に提示した書である。心の状態と脳の物理的状態がどのようにかかわっているのかについて、神経科学理論や心の表象理論を軸に、理論的・経験主義的・神経科学的な側面をバランスよく論じている。前半は主として志向性とクオリアの問題を扱い、後半では表象がどのように心で組織化されて志向性の源になっていくのかを検討する。 This book systematically presents the current appearance of "conscious science" which is newly born in the region where philosophy, psychology, and brain science intersect. I discuss the theoretical, empiricistic and neuroscientological aspects in a well-balanced manner about the state of mind and the physical state of the brain about the neuroscience theory and the mental representation theory. In the first half, we mainly deal with issues of intentionality and qualia, and in the second half we examine how representations become organized by mind and become sources of intention.
Rose, D. (2006). Consciousness: philosophical, psychological and neural theories
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Consciousness is a state of being aware — of our self, of our surroundings, of our place in those surroundings. Yet what makes us conscious? What neural processes drive our awareness, and how do these processes relate to what we think of as our mind? "Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Neural Theories" seeks to respond to some of these questions, offering a wealth of information from which the reader can develop their own views of the subject. Taking a critical, thought-provoking approach, the book integrates studies from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to capture the major themes on which our current understanding of consciousness is based. Opening with a series of chapters that introduce us to thinking about mind, the book goes on to explore function and brain, examining such topics as functionalism, representation, and brain dynamics. Understanding consciousness remains one of today's greatest challenges. "Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Neural Theories" demystifies what is known about the interface of brain and mind, and offers intriguing insights into what remains to be discovered.
Brown, D., Lyons, E. & Rose, D. (2006). Recovery from brain injury: finding the missing bits of the puzzle
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Background: One basic problem found during rehabilitation is that people with brain injuries lack awareness of their difficulties. Research into this phenomenon has often disregarded the voices of those affected by the trauma and do not give an insider’s perspective on the process through which a person with a brain injury develops awareness of their difficulties. Objective: To explore how people construct their experiences of brain injury and the challenges they face afterwards. Setting: Two day care centres. Method: In-depth interviews were conducted with 24 individuals with brain injuries. Data were analysed using the interpretative phenomenological approach (IPA). Results: Three themes were found to be relevant for understanding how participants construct their experiences of brain injury: finding the bits of the puzzle, filling the holes of memory and redefining the self. The evidence suggests that they construct knowledge of their difficulties in a manner resembling the sorting of a puzzle. Conclusion: Qualitative enquiries into awareness of difficulties provide clinical and rehabilitation settings with new insights and alternative strategies for interventions.
Breakwell, G. M. & Rose, D. (2006). Theory, method and research design
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the importance of theory building and the difficulties associated with theory testing. In order to do this, the scientific method and its limitations are described. The relevant, and often debated, distinctions between positivist and constructionist approaches to theory and research are summarized. Different types of data elicitation are outlined and their relationship to data analysis considered. The varieties of research designs that can be used for monitoring changes are examined and the role of manipulation  in research designs is explained. The chapter concludes by discussing the significance of integrating findings from different types of methods.
Rose, D. (2006). Psychophysical methods
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This chapter serves as an introduction to psychophysical methods. First, I summarize theoretical understanding of what limits sensory detection, and then review the techniques available to investigate those limits. Later, procedures for measuring the strengths of percepts above threshold are considered. Finally, some general issues of experimental practicality are discussed.
Bradshaw, M.F., Hibbard, P.B., Parton, A.D., Rose, D. & Langley, K. (2006). Surface orientation, modulation frequency and the detection and perception of depth defined by binocular disparity and motion parallax
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Binocular disparity and motion parallax provide information about the spatial structure and layout of the world. Descriptive similarities between the two cues have often been noted which have been taken as evidence of a close relationship between them. Here, we report two experiments which investigate the effect of surface orientation and modulation frequency on (i) a threshold detection task and (ii) a supra-threshold depth-matching task using sinusoidally corrugated surfaces defined by binocular disparity or motion parallax. For low frequency corrugations, an orientation anisotropy was observed in both domains, with sensitivity decreasing as surface orientation was varied from horizontal to vertical. In the depth-matching task, for surfaces defined by binocular disparity the greatest depth was seen for oblique orientations. For surfaces defined by motion parallax, perceived depth was found to increase as surface orientation was varied from horizontal to vertical. In neither case was perceived depth for supra-threshold surfaces related to threshold performance in any simple manner. These results reveal clear differences between the perception of depth from binocular disparity or motion parallax, and between perception at threshold and supra-threshold levels of performance.
Fisher, H.L. & Rose, D. (2005). Comparison of the effectiveness of two versions of the Rey memory test in discriminating between actual and simulated memory impairment, with and without the addition of a standard memory test
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The superiority of the modified 16-item Rey memory test over the original 15-item test has yet to be established in relation to the detection of feigned memory deficits. This study compares the effectiveness of these two versions of the test in combination with a standard memory test. Sixty-four participants, equally divided into “controls” and “simulators”, and 32 “memory-impaired” volunteers completed the WAIS-III Digit Span test and either the 15-item or 16-item Rey test. The median scores of the simulators were worse than those of both the controls and the memory-impaired subjects on two types of score on the 16-item test compared to just one on the 15-item test. However, combining the total score from the 16-item test with the digits forward span accurately detected 63% of simulators (with only 6% of nonsimulators wrongly classified as simulators). This performance was better than that obtained from any of the test scores taken singly or from any other combination of a digit span score with a Rey score. It is concluded that the addition of a standard memory test to the Rey memory test improves the detection of individuals feigning memory impairment.
Rose, D. & Harris, J.P. (2005). Perception
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We will see in this chapter firstly that our almost effortless ability to perceive the world around us is achieved by a mass of complicated machinery in the brain. The efficiency of our perceptual mechanisms is acquired over many years of individual learning experience, which continues through adulthood. As perceptual knowledge grows and accumulates, it enables ever more efficient interpretation of the stimuli that impinge upon our sensory receptors. There is continual, recurrent interaction between our knowledge base (‘top-down’, conceptually driven) and the current sensory inflow from the environment (‘bottom-up’, stimulus driven). Repetitive occurrences of the same environmental phenomena can change the very fabric of the perceptual-sensory systems. Bottom-up processing occurs both serially and in parallel. Top-down influences are demonstrable both psychophysically and physiologically. Psychological investigations of perceptual phenomena and biological studies of the neural hardware interact with each other.
Clarke, T.J., Bradshaw, M.F., Field, D.T., Hampson, S.E. & Rose, D. (2005). The perception of emotion from body movement in point-light displays of interpersonal dialogue
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We examined whether it is possible to identify the emotional content of behaviour from point-light displays where pairs of actors are engaged in interpersonal communication. These actors displayed a series of emotions, which included sadness, anger, joy, disgust, fear, and romantic love. In experiment 1, subjects viewed brief clips of these point-light displays presented the right way up and upside down. In experiment 2, the importance of the interaction between the two figures in the recognition of emotion was examined. Subjects were shown upright versions of (i) the original pairs (dyads), (ii) a single actor (monad), and (iii) a dyad comprising a single actor and his/her mirror image (reflected dyad). In each experiment, the subjects rated the emotional content of the displays by moving a slider along a horizontal scale. All of the emotions received a rating for every clip. In experiment 1, when the displays were upright, the correct emotions were identified in each case except disgust; but, when the displays were inverted, performance was significantly diminished for some emotions. In experiment 2, the recognition of love and joy was impaired by the absence of the acting partner, and the recognition of sadness, joy, and fear was impaired in the non-veridical (mirror image) displays. These findings both support and extend previous research by showing that biological motion is sufficient for the perception of emotion, although inversion affects performance. Moreover, emotion perception from biological motion can be affected by the veridical or non-veridical social context within the displays.
Barrett, D.J.K., Bradshaw, M.F. & Rose, D. (2003). Endogenous shifts of covert attention operate within multiple coordinate frames: evidence from a feature-priming task
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The locations of visual objects and events in the world are represented in a number of different coordinate frameworks. For example, a visual transient is known to attract (exogenous) attention and facilitate performance within an egocentric framework. However, when attention is allocated voluntarily to a particular visual feature (ie endogenous attention), the location of that feature appears to be variously encoded either within an allocentric framework or in a spatially invariant manner. In three experiments we investigated the importance of location for the allocation of endogenous attention and whether egocentric and/or allocentric spatial frameworks are involved. Primes and targets were presented in four conditions designed to vary systematically their spatial relationships in egocentric and allocentric coordinates. A reliable effect of egocentric priming was found in all three experiments, which suggests that endogenous shifts of attention towards targets defined by a particular feature operate in an egocentric representation of visual space. In addition, allocentric priming was also found for targets primed by their colour or shape. This suggests that attending to targets primed by nonspatial attributes results in facilitation that is localised in more than one coordinate frame of spatial reference.
Rose, D., Bradshaw, M.F. & Hibbard, P.B. (2003). Attention affects the stereoscopic depth aftereffect
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`Preattentive' vision is typically considered to include several low-level processes, including the perception of depth from binocular disparity and motion parallax. However, doubt was cast on this model when it was shown that a secondary attentional task can modulate the motion aftereffect (Chaudhuri, 1990 Nature 344 60-62). Here we investigate whether attention can also affect the depth aftereffect (Blakemore and Julesz, 1971 Science 171 286-288). Subjects adapted to stationary or moving random-dot patterns segmented into depth planes while attention was manipulated with a secondary task (character processing at parametrically varied rates). We found that the duration of the depth aftereffect can be affected by attentional manipulations, and both its duration and that of the motion aftereffect varied with the difficulty of the secondary task. The results are discussed in the context of dynamic feedback models of vision, and support the penetrability of low-level sensory processes by attentional mechanisms.
Sowden, P.T., Rose, D. & Davies, I.R.L. (2002). Perceptual learning of luminance contrast detection: specific for spatial frequency and retinal location but not orientation
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Performance of a wide range of simple visual tasks improves with practice. Here we ask whether such learning occurs for the fundamental visual task of luminance contrast detection. In two experiments we find that contrast sensitivity increases following extensive practice at detecting briefly presented sinusoidal luminance gratings and that learning is maintained after six months. Learning is spatial frequency tuned, specific to retinal location and can be specific to one eye, but is not selective for orientation. The selectivity of learning implies that it is based on plasticity in early visual, as opposed to central cognitive, processing mechanisms.
Rose, D. & Bressan, P. (2002). Going round in circles: shape effects in the Ebbinghaus illusion
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The Ebbinghaus illusion has traditionally been considered as either a sensory or a cognitive illusion, or some combination of these two. Cognitive contrast explanations take support from the way the illusion varies with the degree of shape similarity between the test and inducing elements; we show, however, that contour interaction explanations may account for this result too. We therefore tested these alternative theories by measuring the illusion with different test shapes as well as different inducer shapes, in all combinations. We found that for angular or hexagonal test shapes there is no similarity effect, and for some shape combinations there is no significant illusion, in contradiction to both of the traditional hypotheses. Instead, we suggest that an integrated model of visual processing is needed to account for the illusion.
Rose, D. (2009). Review of Gregory, R.L. Seeing Through Illusions. Oxford University Press.
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Does what you see have any meaning? How does — how could — it? How can phenomenological experience possibly relate to the physical world? The opening chapter lays the appropriate foundations, in the philosophical issues of science and mind. What we experience cannot all be an arbitrary 'grand illusion'; there must be a contrast with non-illusory perception. Yet knowing what 'true' perception would be like is difficult, since we can only use current scientific models of reality, which themselves reflect our interpretations of the phenomena they are being used to explain.
Rose, D. & Pardhan, S. (2001). Selective attention, ideal observer theory and 'early' visual channels
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Most traditional models of early vision assumed fixed channelling of information through the visual system. However, recent thinking has emphasized the flexibility of the processing and readout of information coming through the visual system, depending on such factors as attention, task demands, learning and practice (see Julesz and Kovács, 1995; Nayar and Poggio, 1996; Karni and Bertini, 1997). Here, we propose a two-stage model based on these new principles. It was developed to explain our empirical results on binocular summation (Pardhan and Rose, 1999). Although qualitative at present, we believe it provides a framework for developing future quantitative, integrative models of channelling in binocular vision.
Barrett, D.J.K., Bradshaw, M.F., Rose, D., Everatt, J. & Simpson, P.J. (2001). Reflexive shifts of covert attention operate in an egocentric coordinate frame
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Covert shifts of attention have been shown to improve detection and discrimination thresholds for a range of visual stimuli. Although there is some evidence to suggest that the allocation of attention to a particular region of interest occurs in a retinotopic frame of reference, the importance of an allocentric, or object-based, framework has gained widespread empirical support. The current experiment investigates the nature of the spatial representation in which covert shifts of attention occur in response to a reflexive prime. Primes and targets were presented in four conditions designed to vary systematically the validity of the spatial relationship between the prime and target in egocentric or allocentric coordinate frameworks. A significant advantage, in terms of reaction time and correct identification, was found for targets located in positions previously primed in an egocentric (but not allocentric) framework whereas there was no advantage for locations primed in an allocentric (but not egocentric) framework. These results suggest that the allocation of covert spatial attention within an egocentric framework may be more important than previously thought.
Davis, A. & Rose, D. (2000). The experimental method in psychology
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Psychological research has two major goals: the description of behaviour and its processes, and their explanation. The descriptive task is met by many different systematic research methods. However the uniqueness and power of the experimental method is that it enables us to address the problem of explanation: how and why a particular behaviour comes about, i.e. its causes. We shall outline the basic tenets of the experimental method and principles of designing experimental research in an attempt to justify the widespread use of experiments within psychology. In doing so, we will concentrate on the reasons why the principles should be adhered to (most but not all of the time), for the sake of psychological theory and not just in the interests of 'good science'.
Breakwell, G.M. & Rose, D. (2000). Research: theory and method
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Why do we do research? We do research to find out what has happened, how it happened, and if possible why it happened. Once we have an idea of what may happen, in other words we have a theory, we can use that theory to predict what will happen in the future. If we also understand why things happen in the way they do, we may even be able to improve the future by intervening in the world. Knowledge is power, knowledge is stored in the form of theories, and as Kurt Lewin once said: 'nothing is as powerful as a good theory'. 
Pardhan, S. & Rose, D. (1999). Binocular and monocular detection of Gabor patches in binocular two-dimensional noise
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Contrast thresholds for detecting sine-wave Gabor patches in two-dimensional externally added random-pixel noise were measured. Thresholds were obtained for monocular and binocular signals in the presence of spatial correlated (identical) and uncorrelated (independent) noise in the two eyes. Measurements were obtained at four different spectral densities of noise (including zero). Thresholds were higher for monocular stimuli than for binocular, and higher in the presence of correlated noise compared to uncorrelated noise. The magnitude of binocular summation, similar in correlated and uncorrelated noise, decreased with increasing noise strength. The independent contributions of internal noise and sampling efficiency to detection were analysed. Sampling efficiencies were higher for binocular than for monocular viewing for both types of noise, with values being higher with uncorrelated noise. Binocular stimuli showed a lower equivalent noise level compared to the mean monocular case for both types of noise.
Rose, D. (1999). The historical roots of the theories of local signs and labelled lines
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The theories of labelled lines and local signs are commonly invoked to explain numerous perceptual phenomena. These theories postulate that perceptual systems use information about which nerve cells or which information channels are activated by the stimulus. The origins of this idea in nineteenth century German psychophysics are traced. From Descartes's idea of a dualistic mind, Kant's idea of a mental ability to conceive space, Da Vinci's ideas of pictorial 'signs', and Müller's idea of 'specific nerve energies' to explain perceptual qualities, Steinbuch, Lotze, and others derived the conclusion that neural-level signs exist that signal stimulus location to the mind. Helmholtz, Hering, and others soon suggested variations on this basic idea. By the time of James the theory had changed yet again. It was revived elsewhere in the 1920s and again in the 1970s, although used implicitly by many workers in between and since. Against a modern metaphysical background, however, a distinction between labels (hardware) and signs (symbols) is the minimum step needed towards an appropriate and comprehensive explanation of perceptual behaviour and experience.
Rose, D. (1999). Creativity, intentionality and the conscious/unconscious distinction: a neural theory
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I begin with a simple question: how do the neural mechanisms of thinking empower us to have novel thoughts? I survey possible neural bases of ideas and investigate the possibility that new ideas form frequently but subconsciously, perhaps because of random occurrences in the brain. Only some of these ideas rise into consciousness, however. We become aware of the 'good' ideas because their neural foundations are more stable than those of poor or meaningless ideas. This view entails hypothesizing that the basis of conscious awareness is the temporal persistence or recurrence of patterns of activity in the brain. The theory fits well with recent thinking on the philosophical issues of intentionality (in that good ideas are the most meaningful) and qualia and is consistent with some recent neural theories of consciousness.
Rose, D. & Blake, R. (1998). Motion perception: from phi to omega
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When human observers view dynamic random noise, such as television 'snow', through a curved or annular aperture, they experience a compelling illusion that the noise is moving smoothly and coherently around the curve (the 'omega effect'). In several series of experiments, we have investigated the conditions under which this effect occurs and the possible mechanisms that might cause it. We contrast the omega effect with 'phi motion', seen when an object suddenly changes position. Our conclusions are that the visual scene is first segmented into objects before a coherent velocity is assigned to the texture on each object's surface. The omega effect arises because there are motion mechanisms that deal specifically with object rotation and these interact with pattern mechanisms sensitive to curvature.
Rose, D. (2019). The painter in the head: a new fallacy?
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We are all warned to avoid the ‘man in the head’ fallacy: the idea that the visual system projects an image of the outside world onto a (virtual) inner screen or stage which our consciousness then inspects – as though each consciousness is a little person, with its own eyes, located inside the head. But does it solve anything to replace the man in the head with a 'painter in the head'? Recent writers have suggested that all visual experience is a form of hallucination or dream, of ‘mental paint’, generated within the mind and ‘depicting’ an (apparent) outside world. But isn’t this too a fallacious explanation? Who decides what to paint, or why, or how? Inside the painter there must be yet another homunculus with the abilities of a complete mind – a mind within a mind – and so on.
Breakwell, G.M. & Rose, D. (2010). Teoria, método e delineamento de pesquisa
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O objetivo deste capítulo é introduzir a importância da construção teórica e as dificuldades associadas com a testagem de um modelo teórico. Para alcançá-lo, o método cientifico e suas limitações são descritos. As distinçoes relevantes e frequentemente debatidas entre as abordagens positivistas e construcionistas da teoria [sic] e da pesquisa são resumidas. Diferentes tipos de coleta ou de obtenção de dados são delineados e suas relações com a análise de dados consideradas. As variedades de modelos de pesquisa que podem ser usadas para monitorar a mudança são examinadas e o papel da manipulação de variáveis nos modelos de pesquisa é explicando. O capítulo conclui discutindo a significação da integração dos resultados de diferentes tipos do métodos.
Rose, D. (2010). Métodos psicofísicos
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Este capítulo serve como uma introdução aos métodos psicofísicos. Primeiro, resumimos a compreensão teórica do que limita a detecção sensorial e, em seguida, revisamos as técnicas disponíveis para investigar esses limites. Posteriormente, são considerados procedimentos para medir os pontos fortes das percepções acima do limite. Finalmente, questões gerais de praticidade experimental são discutidas.
Rose, D. (2021). Perceiving the weird and the wonderful. The mysterious metaphysics of phenomenology, art and science.
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What is it that appears to us: an objective reality or a subjective illusion? A brief history of the continental philosophical approach to this question is given, followed by an introduction to the recent continental movement toward Realism, which accepts there must be mind-independent entities of some kind. Yet if such an objective reality exists this raises the problem of how we can possibly conceptualise what exists and happens there, since by definition it is beyond our concepts — or at least beyond our current ones. Hence it seems mysterious, weird and wonderful. I illustrate how the arts and sciences have independently approached this question, and suggest some commonalities in their conclusions. Finally, I discuss the importance of individual differences in how we perceive and think.
Rose, D. (2021). The metaphysics of perception: enactivism, phenomenology and information.
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Enactivism is a major research programme in the philosophy of perception. Yet its metaphysical status is unclear, since it is claimed to avoid both idealism and realism yet still has aspects of both within it. One attempt to solve this conundrum is based on the fusion of enactivism with phenomenology and the mathematical concept of symmetry breaking (Moss Brender, 2013). I suggest this is not entirely successful and propose it needs the addition of a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics (for example, Informational Structural Realism). The processes we commonly call ‘perception’ are causal transfers of information at certain levels in the hierarchy of meaningful structures that comprise physical reality. Phenomenologists could use the word ‘perception’ metaphorically across all levels, although realists need not do so.